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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
The sort of knowledge we have with regard to the nature and kind of our own phenomenal states has enjoyed considerable prestige in the history of philosophy. Hume claims that ‘The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which being immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions’ (A Treatise of Human Nature, I 4.2). In the New Essays (II 27.238), Leibniz remarks that ‘if the immediate inner experience is not certain, we cannot be sure of any truth of fact.’
1 Hume, David A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge, L.A. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1978 [1739])Google Scholar; Leibniz, G.W. New Essays on Human Understanding, Remnant, P. and Bennett, J. ed. and trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981 [1765])Google Scholar; St.Augustine Contra Academicos, Garvey, Mary ed. and trans. (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press 1942)Google Scholar; Scotus, John Duns Philosophical Writings, Wolter, A. ed. and trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett 1987 [c.1304])Google Scholar; Descartes, Rene The Philosophical Writings of Descartes vol. 2, Cottingham, J. Stoothoff, R. and Murdoch, D. trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984 [1641])Google Scholar; Arnauld, Antoine The Art of Thinking (The Port-Royal Logic), Dickoff, J. and James, P. trans. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1964 [1662])Google Scholar; Brentano, Franz ‘The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena,’ in Chisholm, R.M. ed., Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview 1960) 39–61Google Scholar; Berkeley, George Principles, Dialogues, Correspondence, Turbayne, C.M. ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1965 [1710]Google Scholar). See also Firth, Roderick ‘The Anatomy of Certainty,’ The Philosophical Review 76 (1967) 3–27Google Scholar.
2 There are many different kinds of certainty that have been discussed in the relevant literature, and there are numerous things that have been cited as belonging to the class of things known with certainty. In this paper I am unable to discuss the nature of certainty in any detail, and am interested only in a tiny portion of the possible range of the certain. I am well aware, however, that opinions about the range of the certain have varied considerably. For some liberal views about the range of certainty, see Miller, Richard W. ‘Absolute Certainty,’ Mind 87 (1978) 46–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Malcolm, Norman Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1963)Google Scholar; Moore, G.E. ‘A Defense of Common Sense’ and ‘Certainty,’ both in his Philosophical Papers (London: George Allen and Unwin 1959)Google Scholar; and Klein, Peter Certainty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1981)Google Scholar.
3 See Meinong, Alexius On Emotional Presentation, Schubert Kalsi, M.-L. trans. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 1972 [1917])Google Scholar, esp. ch. 1; Heidelberger, Herbert ‘The Self-Presenting,’ Grazer Philosophische Studien 7, 8 (1979) 59–76Google Scholar, esp. 68 (it should be noted that Heidelberger offers no positive account of the self-presenting, but is sympathetic to the project, and seems to think that one could ultimately be provided); Alston, William Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1989), 14Google Scholar; and Chisholm, Roderick M. Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1989), ch. 3Google Scholar.
4 See Sosa, Ernest Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See especially p. 9 in his introduction.
5 See Van Cleve, James ‘Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle,’ The Philosophical Review 88 (1979) 55–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 61, for a similar analysis.
6 I do not plan to delve into the analysis of faculties, abilities, dispositions, etc. For such discussion, see Ernest Sosa's articles ‘Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue,’ reprinted in his collection Knowledge in Perspective, 225-44, and ‘Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism,’ in Heil, J. and Mele, A. eds., Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992)Google Scholar.
7 Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed., 19
8 Compare Jean-Paul Sartre's account of negativity in Being and Nothingness, Hazel E. Barnes, trans. (New York: Simon and Schuster 1956) ch. 1, §2. For Sartre, the only events and properties legitimate in our ontology are positive ones. We become aware of negative events and properties when our expectations are not met. Sartre, as well as Chisholm, fails to anticipate the problems I raise against this account.
9 The properties under discussion here and following are intrinsic properties only, and not relational, or ‘Cambridge’ ones. Of course I could not know with certainty that my tickle occurred simultaneously with and 3529 miles away from Prince Charles's scratching of his left foot.
10 Although it should be mentioned that Russell does not cite Berkeley in this context, and I do not know if Russell ever gave much consideration to the passage from Berkeley at hand.
11 Bertrand Russell, ‘Knowledge By Acquaintance and Knowledge By Description,’ reprinted in his Mysticism and Logic (London: Longmans, Green 1917), 211
12 Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed., 25
13 Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, 2
14 Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed., 25
15 Chisholm, ‘The Problem of the Speckled Hen,’ Mind 51 (1942) 368-73CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 369 and 372
16 Hardy, G.H. Ramanujan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1940), 16Google Scholar
17 1729 = 123 + 13 = 103 + 93 (Ramanujan, 12). The text implies that this was a spontaneous, intuitive discovery by Ramanujan, not just the recollection of an earlier finding.
18 Luria, A.R. The Mind of a Mnemonist, Solotaroff, L. trans. (New York: Basic 1968)Google Scholar
19 Luria mentions the Japanese mnemonist Ishihara. Cf. Oliver Sacks's patient Martin A. in The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat and Other Clinical Tales (New York: Harper and Row 1987), ch. 22. Also see Hill, A. Lewis ‘Idiot Savants: A Categorization of Abilities,’ Mental Retardation 12 (1974) 12–13Google Scholar, and the extensive bibliography there appended.
20 This account has benefited from a discussion with James Dreier, who has perfect pitch.
21 I wonder what their reaction would have been to 2127 - 1.
22 I am indebted to Roderick Chisholm, Ernest Sosa, and James Dreier for criticisms of ancestors of this paper, and for numerous discussions of the topics treated. I have also benefited from the comments of two anonymous referees for this journal.