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Common sense in Thomas Reid

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

John Greco
John Greco*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 3800 Lindell Blvd, Adorjan Hall 306, Saint Louis, MO, 63108
*
Email: jgreco2@slu.edu
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Abstract

This paper explains the nature and role of common sense in Reid and uses the exposition to answer some of Reid's critics. The key to defending Reid is to distinguish between two kinds of priority that common sense beliefs are supposed to enjoy. Common sense beliefs enjoy epistemological priority in that they constitute a foundation for knowledge; i.e. they have evidential status without being grounded in further evidence themselves. Common sense beliefs enjoy methodological priority in that they constrain philosophical theory: they serve as pre-theoretical commitments that philosophical theories ought to respect in the absence of good reasons for rejecting them.

Keywords

Thomas Reidcommon sensefirst principlesskepticismepistemology
Type
Epistemology
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 41 , Issue S1: New Essays on Reid , July 2011 , pp. 142 - 155
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

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