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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael G. Titelbaum
Michael G. Titelbaum*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
*
Email: titelbaum@gmail.com
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Abstract

What goes wrong, from a rational point of view, when an agent’s beliefs change while her evidence remains constant? I canvass a number of answers to this question suggested by recent literature, then identify some desiderata I would like any potential answer to meet. Finally, I suggest that the rational problem results from the undermining of reasoning processes (and possibly other epistemic processes) that are necessarily extended in time.

Keywords

Reasoningbeliefconsistencyrationalitydiachronic
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 5-6: Special Issue: Belief, Action, and Rationality over Time , December 2015 , pp. 670 - 691
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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