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The cost of truthmaker maximalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mark Jago
Mark Jago*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Humanities Building, University Park, NottinghamNG7 2RD, UK
*
*Email: mark.jago@nottingham.ac.uk
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Abstract

According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. However, it will be argued here that these theories cannot be sustained, and hence maximalism comes with a serious ontological cost. Neither Armstrong's invocation of totality facts nor the Martin-Kukso line on absences can meet this cost satisfactorily. I'll claim that negative facts are the best (and perhaps only) way out of the problem for the truthmaker maximalist.

Keywords

truthmakingmaximalismnegative factsparsimonyontology
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 4 , August 2013 , pp. 460 - 474
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2013

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