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Counterfactuals and Possible Worlds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jonathan Bennett*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia

Extract

This article is a selective review of David Lewis's Counterfactuals (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), a challenging, provocative, absorbingly interesting attempt to analyze statements of the form “If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q.” I shall follow Lewis in calling these “counterfactuals,” and shall nearly follow him in abbreviating them to the form P→Q.

Chapter 1, which is nearly a third of the whole, gives the analysis and proves that it endows counterfactuals with some properties which they evidently do have. Chapter 2 presents some “alternative formulations” of the analysis—a logical jeu d'esprit which I shall not discuss except for the section ( § 2.6) about “cotenability.”

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1974

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References

1 Robert Stalnaker commented patiently on an earlier version of this paper. His generous help saved me from one gross blunder, as well as showing me many places where the argument was weak or unclear or unfair. I am deeply indebted to him.