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The courage of conviction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sarah K. Paul
Sarah K. Paul*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
*
Email: skpaul@wisc.edu
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Abstract

Is there a sense in which we exercise direct volitional control over our beliefs? Most agree that there is not, but discussions tend to focus on control in forming a belief. The focus here is on sustaining a belief over time in the face of ‘epistemic temptation’ to abandon it. It is argued that we do have a capacity for ‘doxastic self-control’ over time that is partly volitional in nature, and that its exercise is rationally permissible.

Keywords

Beliefvolitiontemptationself-controldiachronic rationality
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 5-6: Special Issue: Belief, Action, and Rationality over Time , December 2015 , pp. 647 - 669
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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