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David Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995. Pp. xii + 262.
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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Abstract
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- Critical Notice
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- Copyright © The Authors 1997
References
1 This critical notice was solicited before Richmond Campbell joined the Board of Editors of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
2 Some propositions, e.g., that no standard is justified, are type-two normative but not paradigmatic, since they can be constructed (by use of, e.g., a negation operator) from propositions that imply that some standard is justified but do not themselves imply this (Copp, 28-30).
3 The following owes much to discussion in my ethics seminar at Dalhousie in the spring of 1996.
4 Francesca Wong brought this problem to my attention.
5 This proposal derives from Scanlon, T.M.'s ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism,' Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1982) 103–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 On this point see Babbitt, Susan Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1996),Google Scholar especially Chapters 1-3.
7 The non-reductive contractualist theory in Okin, Susan Moller justice, Gender, and tile Family (New York: Basic Books 1989)Google Scholar moves some distance in this direction.
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