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Debunking, supervenience, and Hume’s Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Mary Leng Open the ORCID record for Mary Leng [Opens in a new window]
Mary Leng*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of York, York, UK
*
Mary Leng mary.leng@york.ac.ukDepartment of Philosophy, University of York, YorkYO10 5DD, UK
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Abstract

Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same.

Keywords

Mathematicsmetaethicsevolutionary debunkingHume’s principlesupervenience
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 8 , December 2019 , pp. 1083 - 1103
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2019

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