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Deference and Ideals of Practical Agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Jonathan Knutzen
Jonathan Knutzen*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, University of Graz, Austria
*
Email: jonathan.knutzen@gmail.com
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Abstract

This paper develops a moderate pessimist account of moral deference. I argue that while some pessimist explanations of the puzzle of moral deference have been misguided in matters of detail, they nevertheless share an important insight, namely that there is a justified moral agency ideal grounded in pro tanto reasons against moral deference. This thought is unpacked in terms of a set of values associated with the practice of morality. I conclude by suggesting that the solution to the puzzle of moral deference developed here gives us a plausible recipe for generalizing to certain cases of nonmoral deference as well.

Keywords

Moral testimonymoral deferencemoderate pessimismagency ideals
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , January 2021 , pp. 17 - 32
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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