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Descartes on Sensation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Zeno Vendler*
Affiliation:
University of Calgary

Extract

Contemporary readers of Descartes can hardly fail to notice that the author uses the word pensée, or cogitatio, in a much broader sense than French speakers use pensée nowadays, or we use the closest English word, thought. He consistently maintains that feelings, sensations, as well as the products of one's fancy, are one and all modes of thought.

Yet, clearly, according to the normal use of the word, sensations of light, of sound, of hunger, and so forth, are not regarded as part of one's thinking, nor do we so regard the spontaneous flight of the imagination one might experience in daydreams or real dreams, or while thinking about unrelated matters. Some of these sensations, notably aches, pains, pangs of hunger, blinding light, and strong noise, are not only not counted among our thoughts, but they are apt to interfere with our thinking, and, in extreme cases, might stop it altogether. In a similar way, the lascivious play of St. Antony's imagination did not embellish his meditations on the holy mysteries; he had to overcome or ignore it to be able to pursue the train of his thought.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1971

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References

1 See, e.g., Descartes, Philosophical Writings (translated and edited by Anscombe, E. and Geach, P.T.) London, 1954: Translators’ note, pp. XLVII f.Google Scholar

2 The notion of thought here outlined is further elaborated in my Say What You Think”, in Studies in Thought and Language (ed. Cowan, J.L.), Tucson, 1970, pp. 7997.Google Scholar

3 Reply to Objections IV: Oeuvres de Descartes (eds. Adam, Charles and Tannery, Paul. Paris, 1897-1913Google Scholar, henceforth abbreviated as AT) VII, 232; The philosophical Works of Descartes (trs. Haldane, E. S. and Ross, G.R.T. Cambridge, 1967, henceforth abbreviated as HR) II, 105.Google Scholar

4 Meditation II: AT VII, 28; HR I, 153. My italics.

5 Letter, March 1638: AT II, 36. Translation, if not credited, is mine. My italics.

6 Meditation VI: AT VII, 73; HR I, 186.

7 Ibid.: AT VII, 78; HR I, 190.

8 Letter (to P. [Gibieuf]), Jan. 1642: AT III, 478.

9 Reply VI: AT VII, 436-37; HR II, 251.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 The Passions of the Soul I, 26: AT XI, 348; HR I, 343.

13 Letter (to Morus), Febr. 1649: AT V, 278; Descartes Selections (ed. Eaton, R.M. New York, 1927), p.360.Google Scholar

14 Letter (to the Marquis of Newcastle), Nov. 1646: AT IV, 575; Eaton 357.

15 Ibid.

16 In the letter to Morus as quoted.

17 In the letter to the Marquis of Newcastle: AT IV, 574; Eaton 356.

18 Passions I, 25: AT XI, 348; HR I, 343.

19 The Principles of Philosophy I, 9: AT VIII, 7.

20 AT IX-2, 28.

21 Meditation VI: AT VII, 78; HR I, 190.

22 Letter, March 1638: AT II, 37. My italics.

23 Meditation II: AT VII, 29; HR I, 153.

24 Replies III (Obj. VI): At VII, 182-183; HR II, 69.

25 Principles I, 9: AT VIII, 7-8; HR I, 222.

26 Meditation VI: AT VII, 81; HR I, 192.

27 See, e.g., Meditation VI: AT VII, 86, HR I, 196, and Synopsis of The Meditations: AT VII, 14; HR I, 141.

28 Meditation VI: AT VII, 73; HR 1, 186.

29 Ibid.: AT VII, 81; HR I, 192.

30 Letter (to Morus), Feb. 1649: AT V, 277; Eaton 359.

31 Critique of Pure Reason (tr. Smith, N. Kemp London, 1953) B. 406.Google Scholar

32 Reply IV: AT VII, 229-30; HR II, 103-4.

33 Letter (to the Marquis of Newcastle) Nov. 1646: AT IV, 573; Eaton 355.

34 Replies (to Burman) April 1648: AT V, 150.