Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-t5tsf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T16:34:37.647Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Ecumenical alethic pluralism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Filippo Ferrari Open the ORCID record for Filippo Ferrari [Opens in a new window]  and
Sebastiano Moruzzi Open the ORCID record for Sebastiano Moruzzi [Opens in a new window]
Filippo Ferrari
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Sebastiano Moruzzi
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism (EAP) is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar as it involves a reconfiguration of the dialectic between deflationists and pluralists.

Keywords

Truthpluralismdeflationismrelativisminflationary argumentnormativitytaste
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , May 2019 , pp. 368 - 393
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Barnard, R., and Ulatowski, J.. Forthcoming. “Does Anyone Really Think that ┌φ┐ Is True if and only if φ?” In Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, edited by Aberdein, A. and Inglis, M.. New York: Bloomsbury.Google Scholar
Bar-On, D., Horisk, C., and Lycan, W.. 2000. “Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.” Philosophical Studies, 101 (1): 1–28. doi:10.1023/A:1026463916160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beall, J. C., 2013. “Deflated Truth Pluralism.” In Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, edited by Pedersen, N. J. L. L., and Wright, C. D., 323–338. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benacerraf, P., 1973. “Mathematical Truth.” Journal of Philosophy, 70: 661–679. doi:10.2307/2025075.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chan, T., ed. 2013. The Aim of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Damnjanovic, N., 2005. “Deflationism and the Success Argument.” Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (218): 53–67. doi:10.1111/phiq.2005.55.issue-218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edwards, D., 2013. “Truth, Winning, and Simple Determination Pluralism.” In Pedersen and Wright, edited by Pedersen, N. J. L. L. and Wright, C. D. 113–122. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Einheuser, I., 2008. “Three Forms of Truth Relativism.” In Relative Truth, edited by García-Carpintero, M. and Kölbel, M., 187–203. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferrari, F., 2018. “The Value of Minimalist Truth.” Synthese, 195: 1103–1125. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1207-9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferrari, F., and Moruzzi, S.. Forthcoming. “Deflating Truth about Taste.” The American Philosophical Quarterly.Google Scholar
Ferrari, F., and Moruzzi, S.S.. Forthcoming “The Integration Challenge to Alethic Pluralism.” Unpublished Manuscript.Google Scholar
Field, H., 2009. “This Magic Moment: Horwich on the Boundaries of Vague Terms.” In Cuts and Clouds, edited by Dietz, R. and Moruzzi, S., 200–208. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fine, K., 2005. Modality and Tense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, P., 1998. Truth. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, P., 2005. “The Sharpness of Vague Terms.” Chap. 4 in Reflections on Meaning, edited by Horwich, P.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, P., 2006. “The Value of Truth.” Noûs, 40 (2): 347–360. doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00613.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, F., 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kölbel, M., 2013. “Should We Be Pluralists about Truth?” In Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, edited by Pedersen, N. J. L. L., and Wright, C. D., 278–297. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. K., 1970. “How to Define Theoretical Terms.” Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. doi:10.2307/2023861.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lynch, M., 2000. “Alethic Pluralism and the Functionalist Theory of Truth.” Acta Analytica, 24: 195–214.Google Scholar
Lynch, M., 2009. Truth as One and Many. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nolan, D., 2009. “Platitudes and Metaphysics.” In Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, edited by Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Nola, R., 267–300. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.Google Scholar
Patterson, D., 2005. “Deflationism and the Truth-Conditional Theory of Meaning.” Philosophical Studies, 124: 271–294. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-7782-0.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pedersen, N. J. L. L., 2010. “Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism.” Philosophical Quarterly, 60 (238): 92–108. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.605.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pedersen, N. J. L. L., and Wright, C. D., eds. 2013. Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, H., 1998. “Three Norms of Assertibility, or How the Moa Became Extinct.” NouûS, 32 (12): 241–254.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H., 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Spencer, J., 2016. “Relativity and Degrees of Relationality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 42 (2): 432–459. doi:10.1111/phpr.12153.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T., 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wollheim, R., 1980. Arts and Its Object. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, C. J., 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge(MA): Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Wright, C. J., 1993. “Anti-Realism, Timeless Truth and Nineteen Eighty-Four.” Chap.10 in Realism Meaning and Truth. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wright, C. J., 1998. “Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28: 31–74. doi:10.1080/00455091.1998.10717495.Google Scholar
Wright, C. J., 2013. “A Plurality of Pluralisms.” In Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, edited by Pedersen, N. J. L. L., and Wright, C. D., 123–153. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, C. J. Forthcoming. “Faultless Disagreement.”Google Scholar