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Excuses and ‘“Ought” Implies “Can”’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Lawrence L. Heintz
Lawrence L. Heintz*
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Barbara
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Extract

I will attempt to do two things in this paper.In Part I) I will show that H.A. Prichard failed to appreciate the limitations of the application of the ‘“ought” implies “can”’ principle. Where the ‘can’ is not the ‘can’ of physical impossibility the principle is false; the principle can be shown to be false when it is read this way by an examination of the role of excuses, which is not that of removing obligations. Part II) demonstrates how the misapplication of the ‘“ought” implies “can”’ principle is utilized in a chain of confusion: a confusion of excuses and justifications with respect to obligations and a confusion of the relation between obligations and blameworthiness.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , November 1975 , pp. 449 - 462
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1975

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References

1 I remind the reader that in “Duty and Ignorance of Fact” Prichard uses “duty,“ “obligation,” and “ought” interchangeably. There are important differences between these locutions. However, for the purposes of this paper, I will not be concerned with those differences nor do I believe those differences would affect the outcome.

2 Prichard, H.A. “Duty and Ignorance of Fact” in Moral Obligation(London, Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 20-1.Google Scholar

3 Ibid., p. 23. The condition Prichard is referring to is a condition for the application of the moral rule.

4 Ibid., p. 24.

5 The claim of ignorance appears in a variety of defenses. It can be offered as a defeating, voiding, suspending, or excusing condition. In this paper I am concerned with Ignorance when it is offered as an excuse.

6 This formulation was suggested to me by Laurence Houlgate. “Not in one's power” is the sense of “cannot” used in most analyses, — see Hampshire, in “Freedom of the Will” (Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Supp. Vol. 25, 1951) p. 163Google Scholar, 170; Henderson, “'Ought” Implies “Can“’ (Philosophy, Vol. 41, 1966) p. 104Google Scholar; Montefiore, “'Ought” and “Can“’ (Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 8, 1958) p. 28.Google Scholar

7 Terence Penelhum rightly suggests a more natural expression would be: “I would have helped my parents; I could have; but I did not because I did not know they needed my help; so do not blame me.” The crucial point here is the claim that Prichard holds is being made, not the form of the accused's words.

8 I am not assuming or implying that all excuses take the form of or are properly expressed in terms of “cannot” or “could not.” Counterexamples to such a view are manifest. Think of the excuses of clumsiness, mistakes, unintentional slips, etc.

9 Prichard, op. cit., p. 20-1.

10 There are numerous sorts of inability, incontinence, kleptomania, alcoholism, pyromania, impulse, etc. These cases, while very complicated, can be dealt with in the same manner as above. The incontinent etc. have their obligations and they have their handicaps. Most often they will fail but there are things that they can do even if it is only to seek help.

11 See Rees, W.J. “The General Nature of A Moral Duty,” (Philosophy, Vol. 28, 1953), p. 47.Google Scholar

12 Prichard, op. cit., pp. 20-1.

13 Austin, J.L. “A Plea for Excuses” in Philosophical Papers (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 176.Google Scholar

14 It will not do to say that the accuser and the accused agree only that there was an obligation. For this much does not yet mark any essential characteristic of excuses. — It could be a justification — i.e., the agreed upon obligation was overridden in a manner that was acceptable.

15 Austin, op. cit., p. 176.

16 There would be no difficulty presented by this phenomenon, had Prichard embraced the distinction made by Sesonske, in Value and Obligation. between oughtO and oughte. Using Sesonske's distinction, “ought” is used evaluatively in the first part of the request to be excused while in the last part the ascription of the obligation is denied. However, for Prichard in “Duty and Ignorance of Fact“ the request to be excused is the same as “Yes. I had a duty to do X, but I couldn't do X because … “ or “Yes, I had a duty to do X, but I couldn't do X because … “ where “duty” and “obligation” are used to ascribe an obligation.

17 Someone may object saying: “We have a ‘higher obligation’ to avoid incurring obligations that we know or suspect we will not be able to fulfil.” However, even if this were the case, the oddity still remains, for I would be blameworthy only for failure to comply with the ‘higher obligation'. I would not be blameworthy for failing to comply with the original obligation to play tennis since the excusing condition removed that obligation.

18 Ewing and Browning are two philosophers who maintain there is a tight connection between blameworthiness and failure to fulfil an obligation. See Ewing, A.C. The Definition of the Good (New York, The MacMillan Co., 1947), p.120Google Scholar and pp. 168-70, and Browning, Douglas “The Moral Act,” (The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 12 April, 1962), p. 101.Google Scholar

19 Ross, W.D. Foundations of Ethics (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 193.Google Scholar

20 Prichard holds the view that a moral rule expresses the thought that one has an obligation to bring about some state of affairs. Cf. Prichard, op. cit., p. 21.