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The Explanatory Structure of the Transcendental Deduction and a Cognitive Interpretation of the First Critique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Scott Edgar
Scott Edgar*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, CanadaV6T 1Z1
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Extract

Consider two competing interpretations of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: the epistemic and cognitive interpretations. The epistemic interpretation presents the first Critique as a work of epistemology, but what is more, it sees Kant as an early proponent of anti-psychologism — the view that descriptions of how the mind works are irrelevant for epistemology. Even if Kant does not always manage to purge certain psychological- sounding idioms from his writing, the epistemic interpretation has it, he is perfectly clear that he means his evaluation of knowledge to be carried out independently of psychology. In contrast, the cognitive interpretation presents the first Critique as a description of the operation of human cognitive faculties — sensibility, the understanding, and reason. Whatever else the first Critique might be on this interpretation, it is at least Kant's articulation of a theory of mind.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , June 2010 , pp. 285 - 314
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2010

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