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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
I wish to defend a functionalist approach to the mind-body problem. I use the word ‘functionalist’ with some reluctance, however; for although it has become the conventional label for the sort of approach taken by such philosophers as H. Putnam and D. C. Dennett, I believe it is somewhat misleading. The functionalist, as I understand him, tries to show how there can be machine analogues of mental states and then argues that just as we are not inclined to postulate an ontological dualism between simulated mental states and the machine's physical states, we need not postulate a dualism between mind and body. The functionalist also argues, however, that it is wrong to identify the mental states or simulated mental states with the physical states.
Recently functionalism has come under attack, first for not being a coherent alternative, and secondly for not being able to provide an adequate account of sensations. I believe that the first objection is misguided and shall deal with it in section I. However, I agree that functionalists have not provided an adequate account of sensations, but I shall try to help remedy this in section II.
1 I am grateful to Professor William Abbott for reading an earlier draft and making many helpful comments.
2 Putnam's major papers defending functionalism are: “Minds and Machines,” in Hook, S. ed., Dimensions of Mind, (New York: NYU Press, 1960), pp. 138–164;Google Scholar “Robots: Machines or Artifically Created Life,” journal of Philosophy, 61 (1964), 668-91; “The Mental life of Some Machines,” in Castandea, H-N. ed., Intentionality, Minds, and Perception, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967), pp. 177–200.Google Scholar For Dennett, see: “Intentional Systems,” journal of Philosophy, 68 (1971), 87-106;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Content and, Consciousness (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
3 See Kalke, William “What is Wrong with Fodor and Putnam's Functionalism,“ Nous 3 (1969), 83-94;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Rorty, Richard “Functionalism, Machines, and Incorrigibility,“ journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972), 203-20;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Rorty, R. “Dennett on Awareness,” Philosophical Studies, 23 (1972), 153-62CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 Kalke, p. 83.
5 Ibid., p. 90.
6 “Intentional Systems.“
7 Ibid., p. 89. It should be noted that once we take the intentional stance with regard to a naturally evolved system it is often useful to talk about the system's design—its feedback mechanisms, its pattern recognizing devices, etc.—as long as we do not take the notion too literally.
8 Rorty, R. “Mind-body Identity, Privacy, and Categories,” Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-51.Google Scholar
9 Quine, W.V.O. Word and Object, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1960), pp. 257-66.Google Scholar
10 Cf. Ibid., pp. 216–21.
11 “Minds and Machines.“
12 Ibid., p. 143.
13 Ibid., p. 148.
14 Ibid., p. 143.
15 Cf. Rorty, “Functionalism.“
16 ‘Disposition’ may be a somewhat misleading term, although I do not know what to use in its place. What I mean to suggest is that there is a disposition ceteris paribus, to report some internal state, but it is only one of many “inputs” and may be overruled by any of an open-ended number of considerations.
17 “Robots”, p. 770.
18 For a discussion of the different senses of ‘appear’ cf. Chisholm, R. Theory of Knowledge, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 30f.Google Scholar
19 Cf. Rorty, “Functionalism”, pp. 216f.
20 There may well be corrigible, non-inferential knowledge and incorrigible, inferential knowledge, but our knowledge of our beliefs, as well as our sensations, is both non-inferential and incorrigible.
21 “Unconscious Belief,” journal of Philosophy, 66 (1969), 667-80.
22 Ibid., p. 670.
23 Content and Consciousness, chap. 6.
24 “On Describing Colours,” Inquiry, 10 (1967), 38-52.
25 Cf. Melzack, Ronald The Puzzle of Pain, (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1973), pp. 93–103.Google Scholar
26 Cf. Putnam, “Robots.“