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The guise of the good and the problem of partiality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Allan Hazlett
Allan Hazlett*
Affiliation:
Washington University in Saint Louis, St Louis, USA
*
Allan Hazlett hazlettallan@yahoo.com
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Abstract

According to the guise of the good thesis, we desire things under the ‘guise of the good.’ Here I sympathetically articulate a generic formulation of the guise of the good thesis, and address a problem for the view, which I call the problem of partiality. The problem is, roughly, that our partial pro-attitudes–for example, our special concern for ourselves–do not correspond to what is absolutely good. I criticize three solutions to the problem, and propose an alternative strategy, on which partial pro-attitudes constitute a species of illusion.

Keywords

Guise of the goodpro-attitudes desirepreferencerepresentationaim of beliefpartialityfitting attitudes
Type
Original Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 6 , September 2019 , pp. 851 - 872
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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