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History and Personal Autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Alfred Mele
Alfred Mele*
Affiliation:
Davidson College, Davidson, NC, 28036, USA
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Extract

John Christman, in ‘Autonomy and Personal History,’ advances a novel genetic or historical account of individual autonomy. He formulates ‘the conditions of the [i.e., his] new model of autonomy’ as follows:

  • (i) A person P is autonomous relative to some desire D if it is the case that P did not resist the development of D when attending to this process of development, or P would not have resisted that development had P attended to the process;

  • (ii) The lack of resistance to the development of D did not take place (or would not have) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection;

and

  • (iii) The self-reflection involved in condition (i) [sic] is (minimally) rational and involves no self-deception. (11)

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , June 1993 , pp. 271 - 280
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1993

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References

1 Christman, John ‘Autonomy and Personal History,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991) 1-24CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Suppose that the above-mentioned shout evokes in our sprinter a fleeting and comparatively weak desire not to start running, and that — owing to spectators’ pranks in the past — she has reflectively formed a policy of ignoring all such shouts at the starting line (and any desires that they might prompt in her), unless she sees that her path is obstructed. Given that her policy recommends against acting on her desire to refrain from running and that she in fact starts running, I do not see how the mere presence of that desire, in the circumstances, thwarts autonomy relative to her desire to run. If the sprinter judged it best not to run, but could not control her desire to start running, matters might be significantly different.

3 Akratic or incontinent action, traditionally conceived, is distinguished from compelled action (see Mele, Alfred Irrationality [New York: Oxford University Press 1987], 4 and 22-9)Google Scholar. For present purposes, the distinction need not concern us.

4 In personal correspondence, Christman has indicated that he wishes to view his rationality requirement as calling also for present minimal rationality, not just rationality with respect to the development of desires. That is a step in a promising direction. (Notice that rationality enters [iii] as a condition on, and only on, past [actual or hypothetical] reflection. See also the summary claim just quoted from 22.)

5 See Mele, Alfred Springs of Action (New York: Oxford University Press 1992)Google Scholar, Ch. 5.

6 This paper was completed during my tenure of a 1992/93 NEH Fellowship for College Teachers. I am grateful to John Christman, an editor, and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions.