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Hume, Locke and consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Terence Penelhum*
Affiliation:
Department of Religious Studies, University of Calgary, 5604 Baroc Rd NW, Calgary, ABT3A 4R2, Canada

Abstract

This is a reply to Donald Ainslie's discussion of Terence Penelhum's work on Hume, Locke and the nature of consciousness; although agree on many points about the differences between Locke and Hume, I take issue with Ainslie's views about the epistemic status Hume accords to introspective acts.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

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References

Ainslie, Donald 2003. “Hume, a Scottish Socrates?Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1): 133154.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baier, Annette 1991. A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Fogelin, Robert 2009. Hume's Skeptical Crisis: A Textual Study. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Penelhum, Terence 1975. Hume. London: MacMillan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Penelhum, Terence 1992. David Hume: An Introduction to His Philosophical System. Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.Google Scholar
Penelhum, Terence 2000. Themes in Hume: The Self, The Will and Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar