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Hume’s nominalism and the Copy Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Ruth Weintraub
Ruth Weintraub*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Tel-Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv69978, Tel-Aviv, Israel
*
*Email: weintrar@post.tau.ac.il
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Abstract

I consider some ways in which the Copy Principle (CP) and Hume's nominalism impinge on one another, arguing for the following claims. First, Hume's argument against indeterminate ideas isn't cogent even if the CP is accepted. But this does not vindicate Locke: the imagistic conception of ideas, presupposed by the CP, will force Locke to accept something like Hume's view of the way general terms function, the availability of abstract ideas notwithstanding. Second, Hume's discussion of nominalism provides support for the “old Hume” interpretation, that which takes the CP to be a criterion of meaningfulness, as against the “new Hume” reading, according to which it constrains what we can know. Finally, nominalism forces Hume to adopt a more complicated theory of ideas.

Keywords

HumeLockenominalismCopy Principleseparability
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 42 , Issue S1: Hume in Alberta: Selected Papers from the 2012 Hume Conference in Calgary , February 2012 , pp. 45 - 54
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

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