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J.P. Burgess and G. Rosen A Subject with no Object. Oxford: Clarendon 1997. Pp. x + 259.

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J.P. Burgess and G. Rosen A Subject with no Object. Oxford: Clarendon 1997. Pp. x + 259.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jean-Pierre Marquis
Jean-Pierre Marquis*
Affiliation:
Université de MontréalMontréal, PQH3C 3J7Canada
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Abstract

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Type
Critical Notice
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , March 2000 , pp. 161 - 178
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2000

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References

1 Burgess, J.P. ‘Why I am not a Nominalist,’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24 (1983) 93–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Synthetic Mechanics,’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (1984) 379-95; ‘Synthetic Mechanics Revisited,’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (1990) 121-30; ‘Epistemology and Nominalism,’ in Physicalism and Mathematics, Irvine, A. ed. (Boston: Dordrecht 1990) 1–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Synthetic Physics and Nominalist Realism,’ in Philosophical and Foundational Issues in Measurement Theory, Savage, C.W. and Ehrlich, P. eds. (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum 1992) 119–38Google Scholar

2 Rosen, G. Remarks on Modern Nominalism (Princeton: PhD dissertation 1992)Google Scholar; ‘The Refutation of Nominalism(?)’ Philosophical Topics 21 (1993) 149-86; ‘What is Constructive Empiricism?’ Philosophical Studies 74 (1994) 143-78

3 Chihara, C. Constructivism and Mathematical Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990)Google Scholar

4 Putnam, H. ‘What is Mathematical Truth?’ in Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1975) 60–78, at 74-5Google Scholar

5 Maddy, P. ‘Indispensability and Practice,’ Journal of Philosophy 89 (1992) 275-89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Naturalism and Ontology,’ Philosophia Mathematica 3 (1995) 248-70; Naturalism in Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997)

6 Resnick, M. ‘Scientific and Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument,’ Philosophia Mathematica 3 (1995) 166-74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mathematics as a Science of Patterns (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997)

7 I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their suggestions and Marc Ereshefsky for his patience and advice. Needless to say, I am entirely responsible for the contents of this review. Financial support from the Alexander Von Humboldt Foundation and SSHRC of Canada while this work was done is gratefully acknowledged.