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Justice and Utility
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Extract
That utility is not a sufficient test for a set of social rules to be morally binding upon a group of persons has been argued in a number of recent books and articles. Yet it is generally conceded in these arguments that a group's observance of rules makes possible greater benefits than would accrue if each did not associate himself with others under the rules. It is not denied that the practice of morality is socially advantageous. What is denied is that social advantage is either the sole criterion or a sufficient criterion for the justifiability of any set of rules that could constitute the de facto system of moral requirements in a given society.
What, then, is sufficient? The answer I am interested in defending in this paper is that both utility as an aggregative principle and justice as a distributive principle are each a necessary condition and together provide a sufficient condition for the justification of a moral code. In the first two parts of this paper, I shall explain how the concepts of justice and utility, respectively, are to be construed in the argument of the third part.
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- Copyright © The Authors 1972
References
1 Among the most important are: Rawls, J. “Justice As Fairness.” Philosophical Review, Vol. 67 (1958), 164–194CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Diggs, B. J. “Rules and Utililitarianism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1964), 32–44Google Scholar; Lyons, D. Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rescher, N. Distributive Justice (Indianapolis, lnd, 1966)Google Scholar; Grice, G. R. The Grounds of Moral Judgement (Cambridge, 1967)Google Scholar; and Hodgson, D. H. Consequences of Utilitarianism (Oxford, 1967).Google Scholar
2 Two clear statements of the distinction between constitutive and directive or regulative rules may be found in: Zink, S. The Concepts of Ethics (New York, 1962), Ch. IVCrossRefGoogle Scholar, and J. R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969), Ch. 2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 This is well argued by G. R. Grice, op. cit., Ch. 1.
4 Brandt, R. B. “Some Merits of One Form of Rule-Utilitarianism,” University of Colorado Studies in Philosophy, Series No.3 (Boulder, Colo., 1967), p. 53n.Google Scholar
5 B. J. Diggs, op. cit.
6 Ibid., p. 42.
7 Ibid., p. 43.
8 Ibid., p. 43.
9 An excellent study of the relation between an individual's values and the forms of social existence in which he lives is contained in: Emmet, Dorothy Rules, Roles and Relations (New York, 1967).Google Scholar
10 R. B. Brandt, op. cit. This statement pertains to utility only, not to justice. At the end of his article Brandt states that he has not discussed the question whether the utilitarian theory he espouses can account for the concept of justice. I do not know if he would find acceptable the view of justice and its relation to utility presented here.
11 By a ‘denial’ I mean a decision or commitment in any given case to adopt the contradictory of a principle, as distinct from not making any decision or commitment with regard to either a principle or its contradictory.
12 I mean here the illocutionary act of asserting the rule as, a rule applicable to oneself, that is, the act of subscribing to the rule as a guide to one's conduct. The assertion of the rule is the expression of a commitment-in-action, not merely the expression of a commitment-in-belief.
13 In terms of the theory of reasons-for-acting developed by Thomas Nagel. the social constraint cannot provide the ‘motivational content’ of a practical judgment, acknowledgment of which would justify an action. See Nagel, T. The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford, 1970), Ch. VIII and XI.Google Scholar
14 Or if moral reasons are involved, they must be reasons grounded on moral ideals that go beyond the duty to be just. This will be explained further below.
15 By ‘goods’ I here mean any conditions that increase either the efficacy of one's will or one's freedom of choice. The same interpretation is to be placed upon ‘benefit’ and ‘utility’ in this argument.