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Knowing How, What and That

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Nathan Brett
Nathan Brett*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph
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Extract

In an examination of Ryle's distinction between knowing how and knowing that D. G. Brown is led to the conclusion that “All knowing how is knowing that.” The distinction (in the form that Ryle drew it) is improper, and these tags should be dropped. All knowledge is propositional, after all, though there is a legitimate way of retaining the essentials of Ryle's account. Knowledge for which the primary evidence is a person's performance replaces the category of knowing how in this reformulated version of the distinction. But to have this type of knowledge is to know the answers to questions concerning the way in which it can be done. And this is knowing that.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , December 1974 , pp. 293 - 300
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1974

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References

1 D. G. Brown, “Knowing How and Knowing That, What,” in Wood and Pitcher (eds.), Ryle (London, 1971 ), pp. 213–248. References in parentheses are to this collection of essays.

2 Some philosophers have gotten around this by simply using the expression ‘know how to'. Cf. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behaviour (London, 1965), pp. 222ff.

3 The Concept of Mind (New York, 1949). Chapter II, passim; and “Knowing How and Knowing That,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XLVI (1945-46), pp. 1–16.