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Linguistic Choice and Moral Choice: A Reply to Richter
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Extract
Richter begins with a set of counter examples to a position that he acknowledges is not important to me. He goes on to produce counter examples to a position I do not hold. And he concludes by imputing a project to me that I nowhere endorse and by ridiculing that project. Part of his confusion is my fault since what I have done is not entirely consistent with what I claimed to have done. So let me try to clarify and to develop what I take to be valuable in my paper.
To begin with, it was not my main intent to offer an account of the ordinary use of the term ‘racist’ (although Richter admits this, he goes on for several pages as if he were ignorant of it). Indeed, for reasons that will be dear presently, I now think that the attempt to provide such an account is misguided. Whether I have offered an account of what Richter calls a ‘central use’ depends on what he means by ‘central use.’ Judging from his proposed counter examples, he seems to hold (roughly) that whatever satisfies the definition of a central use of some expression ‘e’ will be acknowledged by all competent speakers as a case of e.In this sense of ‘central use’ I have not offered an account of a central use of ‘racist’ either. What, then, have I done?
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References
1 The expression ‘contested concepts’ was introduced by Gallie, W .B. in his fine paper ‘Essentially Contested Concepts.’ (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 [1956] 167CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Although his analysis was a kind of inspiration to me, there are important differences between the uses we make of this notion and the meanings we attribute to it.
2 Most of the confusion is created by the paragraph at the top of page 80. Shortly thereafter, I also claim that marching Jews off to gas ovens is a paradigm case of a racist act. Had I been completely clear about what I was doing I would have said, rather, that is is a paradigm case of what ought to be considered a racist act. (On agent-centered uses, it might not be racist at all.)
3 I do not believe that moral arguments are always sufficient to establish that a contested term ought to be used in a particular way. Some cases, e.g. ‘freedom’ are more complex. But even in such complex cases normative considerations are relevant. See, e.g. Isaiah Berlin's classic essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (in Berlin, Isaiah Four Essays on Liberty [Oxford: Oxford University Press 1969])Google Scholar and C. B. Macpherson's response ‘Berlin's Division of Liberty’ (in Macpherson, C. B. Democratic Theory [Oxford: Clarendon Press 1973]Google Scholar).
4 On Richter's account the perpetrator of a racist act need not have racist beliefs or feelings so long as he is acting as the agent of someone who does (e.g. as a Nazi concentration camp guard is acting as an agent of the Nazi regime). This enables him to say that the man who ties nooses at Klan meetings for business reasons acts in a racist manner — since he acts as an agent of the Klan — but it does not allow him to deal with the present cases. (It is no use to say that employers act as agents of stockholders; if the stockholders know of the policy, this just moves the racism back a step. In any case the example can be restricted to people who own their own business.)
5 Indeed, these uses conceal complicity. For if I am free of racist beliefs and feelings myself (and do not act as an agent of someone less innocent), I cannot perform a racist act on such views. It is not surprising that this position is attractive to members of the victimizing groups. It enables one to advance one's interests by participating fully in the business as usual forms of racism in one's society without acknowledging responsibility for the victimization of victimized groups. It thereby frees one of any felt need to minimize the extent or the effects of one's complicity, or to try to compensate for it by participating in the struggle against institutionalized racism. That is, it enables one to go along with the program without moral pangs.
6 In fact, spokespersons for victimized groups do sometimes speak this way. On balance, however, I think that the account I present is better supported by moral argument. Unfortunately, I cannot address this issue in the space permitted for this reply.
7 Richter weakens the example. A more awkward case for my view is one in which the reporting of a scientific finding — e.g. a finding about some genetically important enzyme — is certain to lead to the further victimization of a victimized group. If it can be argued that this reporting, of itself, mistreats or can reasonably be expected to mistreat that group, then a normal activity of a biochemist, qua biochemist, will turn out to be a racist act. I cannot discuss this case in detail in the space allowed but it is worth noting that on my account: (1) if the reporting of this fact is certain to increase victimization, then it is also certain to increase racism; (2) the biochemist may nonetheless have good reasons for reporting it; and (3) the fact that she reports it does not entail that she is a racist. Other troubling cases of this kind were brought to my attention by Mark Okrent and Charlotte Witt.