Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-4rdpn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-15T01:51:37.876Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Many Moral Particularisms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sean McKeever  and
Michael Ridge
Sean McKeever
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Religion, Ithaca College, Ithaca, NY14850-7286, USA
Michael Ridge
Affiliation:
The University of Edinburgh, EdinburghEH8 9JX, UK
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

What place, if any, moral principles should or do have in moral life has been a longstanding question f or moral philosophy. For some, the proposition that moral philosophy should strive to articulate moral principles has been an article of faith. At least since Aristotle, however, there has been a rieh counter-tradition that questions the possibility or value of trying to capture morality in principled terms. In recent years, philosophers who question principled approaches to morality have argued under the banner of moral particularism. Particularists can be found in diverse areas of philosophical inquiry, and their positions and arguments are of broad interest. Despite its importance, a proper evaluation of particularism has been hindered both by the diversity of arguments employed to defend it, and, perhaps more significantly, by the diversity of positions that can fairly claim to be particularist.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , March 2005 , pp. 83 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Baier, A. 1985. ‘Doing Without Moral Theory?’ in Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, S. Clarke and E. Simpson, eds. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 1971. ‘Moral Realism’ in Morality and Moral Reasoning, Casey, J. ed. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bonjour, L. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Brink, D. 1994. ‘Moral Conflict and Its Structure.’ The Philosophical Review 103 215–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clarke, S. 1987. ‘Anti-Theory in Ethics.’ American Philosophical Quarterly 24.Google Scholar
Clarke, S. and Simpson, E. eds. 1989. Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.Google Scholar
Crisp, R. 2000. ‘Particularizing Particularism’ in Moral Particularism, Hooker, B. and Little, M. eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dancy, J. 1981. ‘On Moral Properties.’ Mind 90.Google Scholar
Dancy, J. 1985. ‘The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dancy, J. 1992. ‘Caring About Justice.’ Philosophy 67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dancy, J. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Dancy, J. 2000. ‘The Particularist's Progress,’ in Moral Particularism, Hooker, B. and Little, M. eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Foot, P. 1983. ‘Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma.’ Journal of Philosophy 80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foot, P. and Harrison, J. 1954. ‘When is a Principle a Moral Principle?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume28.Google Scholar
Gay, R. 1985. ‘Ethical Pluralism: A Reply to Dancy's “Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties.”’ Mind 94.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. 2002. Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don't. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hare, R.M. 1981. Moral Thinking. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holton, R. 2002. ‘Particularism and Moral Theory.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volume 76 PAGES???CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Honderich, T. ed. 1985. Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J.L. Mackie. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Hooker, B. 2000. ‘Moral Particularism—Wrong and Bad,’ in Moral Particularism, Hooker, B. and Little, M. eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hooker, B. and Little, M. eds. 2000. Moral Particularism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hursthouse, R. 1995. ‘Applying Virtue Ethics,’ in Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, Hursthouse, R. Lawrence, G. and Quinn, W. eds. New York: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Jackson, F. Pettit, P. and Smith, M. 2000. ‘Ethical Particularism and Patterns,’ in Moral Particularism, Hooker, B. and Little, M. eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, I. 1972 (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Paton, J. trans. London: Hutchinson.Google Scholar
Krips, H. 1982. ‘Epistemological Holism: Duhem or Quine?’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Little, M. 1997. ‘Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind.’ Nous 31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Little, M. 2000. ‘Moral Generalities Revisited,’ in Moral Particularism, Hooker, B. and Little, M. eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Little, M. 2001. ‘On Knowing the “Why”: Particularism and Moral Theory.’ Hastings Center Report 31.Google ScholarPubMed
Louden, R. 1990. ‘Virtue Ethics and Anti-Theory.’ Philosophia 20. Mackie, J.L. 1977 Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason.’ The Monist 62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, J. 1985. ‘Values and Secondary Qualities,’ in Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J.L. Mackie, Honderich, T. ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
McKeever, S. and Ridge, M. 2005. ‘What Does Holism Have To Do with Particularism?’ Ratio, forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McNaughton, D. 1988. Moral Vision. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Moore, G.E. 1903. Prindpia Ethica. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Nozick, R. 1993. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Pietroski, P. 1993. ‘Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory.’ Ethics 103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W.V. 1966. ‘On Simple Theories of a Complex World,’ in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 255–8.Google Scholar
Ross, W.D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Sayre-McCord, G. 1986. ‘The Many Moral Realisms.’ Spindel Conference: Moral Realism, Southern Journal of Philosophy 24. Reprinted in Essays on Moral Realism, G. Sayre-McCord, ed.Google Scholar
Sayre-McCord, G. ed. 1988. Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Shafer-Landu, R. 1997. ‘Moral Rules.’ Ethics 107.Google Scholar
Singer, P. ed. 1991. A Companion to Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 1999. ‘Some Varieties of Particularism.’ Metaphilosophy 30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: BlackwellGoogle Scholar
Stratton-Lake, P. 1999. ‘Why Externalism is not a Problem for Ethical Intuitionists.’ Proceedings Of The Aristotelian Society 99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stratton-Lake, P. 2000. Kant, Duty, and Moral Worth. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Stratton-Lake, P. ed. 2002. Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Williams, B. 1973a. ‘Ethical Consistency,’ in Problems of the Seif. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, B. 1973b. ‘Critique of Utilitarianism,’ in Utilitarianism: For and Against, Smart, J.J.C. and Williams, B.. London: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar