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A new moral sentimentalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Eric Vogelstein
Eric Vogelstein*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and School of Nursing, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, USA
*
Email: VogelsteinE@duq.edu
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Abstract

This paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.

Keywords

Sentimentalismmoral emotioncompassionrespectmoral reasons
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , June 2016 , pp. 346 - 368
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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