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The New Puzzle of Moral Deference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2020

Max Lewis
Max Lewis*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
*
Email: max.lewis@gmail.com
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Abstract

Philosophers think that there is something fishy about moral deference. The most common explanation of this fishiness is that moral deference doesn’t yield the epistemic states necessary for certain moral achievements (e.g., acting with moral worth or being virtuous). First, I argue that this explanation overgeneralizes. It entails that using many intuitively kosher belief-formation methods (e.g., abduction, reductio ad absurdum, and intuition) should be off-putting. Second, I argue that moral deference is sometimes superior to these other methods because it puts one in a better position to gain the relevant moral achievements.

Keywords

Moral testimonymoral deferencemoral deference pessimismmoral epistemologytestimony
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , May 2020 , pp. 460 - 476
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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