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On Postulating Universals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Bruce Aune
Bruce Aune*
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts
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Extract

Although philosophy has undergone a number of revolutions since the turn of the century, the existence of universals is still debated largely in the terms employed by Moore and Russell around 1910. A recent article by Alan Donagan illustrates this nicely, for Donagan expounds and defends what he takes to be the principal argument for universals given by Russell in The Problems of Philosophy. I shall comment critically on the case Donagan makes for Russell's metaphysical realism, but my main concern is to establish a point of more general interest—namely, that the most plausible strategy for defending a commitment to universals actually raises more problems than it promises to solve.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , December 1973 , pp. 285 - 294
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1973

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References

1 Donagan, Alan “Universals and Metaphysical Realism,” The Monist, XLV (1963)Google Scholar; reprinted in Loux, M. J. ed., Universals and Particulars (Garden City, N. Y., 1970), pp. 128–158.Google Scholar My page references to this essay refer to the reprint in Loux.

2 Russell, Bertrand The Problems of Philosophy (London, reset ed., 1946), p. 90.Google Scholar

3 Ibid., p. 95.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 96.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 In his “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,” Proc. Arist. Soc. (1911-12), Russell acknowledged that such a regress is possible, but he claimed that it is “plainly vicious” since it does not allow us to “explain the likeness of two terms” (p. 9). The need to offer a metaphysical explanation of the likeness of two terms is, however, highly questionable, and it would certainly be repudiated by Berkeley and Hume. I comment on this alleged need below: see p. 288.

10 See Harman, Gilbert “The Inference to the Best Explanation,” Phil. Rev., LXIV (1965), 88–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar I make no claim here for the precise form such an inference should take; I am concerned merely with certain features that should be possessed by any such inference used to support a commitment to metaphysical realism.

11 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Ogden, C. K. (London, 1922)Google Scholar, 3.1432. Russell, himself, in The Principles of Mathematics (London, 1903)Google Scholar, indicated that propositions have a special unity that is not due to the “terms” composing them, but he was unable to say much about it; see p. 50, sect. 54.

12 See Bergmann, Gustav “Ineffability, Ontology, and Method,” Phil. Rev., LXIX (1960), 18-40.Google Scholar

13 See Sellars, Wilfrid “Naming and Saying,” in Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality (London), 1963), pp. 225–246.Google Scholar

14 See e.g. Prior, A. N. Objects of Thought (Oxford, 1971), pp. 5f.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 Donagan, p. 141.

16 Ibid., p. 146.

17 Ibid., p. 144.

18 The American College Dictionary (Random House, 1965).

19 Russell, Bertrand An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (London, 1948), P 97.Google Scholar

20 I am indebted to Gary Matthews for his helpful comments on this paper.