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On Social Defeat

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 July 2020

B. J. C. Madison
B. J. C. Madison*
Affiliation:
College of Humanities and Social Sciences, United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, UAE
*
Email: bjcmadison@gmail.com
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Abstract

Influential cases have been provided that seem to suggest that one can fail to have knowledge because of the social environment. If not a distinct kind of social defeater, is there a uniquely social phenomenon that defeats knowledge? My aim in this paper is to explore these questions. I shall argue that despite initial appearances to the contrary, we have no reason to accept a special class of social defeater, nor any essentially social defeat phenomenon. We can explain putative cases of social defeat with our existing epistemological apparatus.

Keywords

epistemologysocial epistemologydefeaters
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 6 , August 2020 , pp. 719 - 734
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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