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On Williamson and simplicity in modal logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Theodore Sider
Theodore Sider*
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA.
*
Email: sider@rutgers.edu
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Abstract

According to Timothy Williamson, we should accept the simplest and most powerful second-order modal logic, and as a result accept an ontology of "bare possibilia". This general method for extracting ontology from logic is salutary, but its application in this case depends on a questionable assumption: that modality is a fundamental feature of the world.

Keywords

Williamsonmodalityfundamentalitynecessitism
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 4-5: Special Issue: Williamson on Modality , August 2016 , pp. 683 - 698
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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