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Problems and solutions for a hybrid approach to grounding practical normativity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jeff Behrends
Jeff Behrends*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Illinois State University, Stevenson Hall 412, Department Box 4540, Normal, IL, 61790-4540, USA
*
*Email: jmbehre@ilstu.edu
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Abstract

Source Hybridism about practical reasons is the position that facts that constitute reasons sometimes derive their normative force from external metaphysical grounds, and sometimes from internal. Although historically less popular than either Source Internalism or Source Externalism, hybridism has lately begun to garner more attention. Here, I further the hybridist’s cause by defending Source Hybridism from three objections. I argue that we are not warranted in rejecting hybridism for any of the following reasons: that hybridists cannot provide an account of normative weight, that hybridists are committed to implausible results concerning practical deliberation, or that Source Hybridism is objectionably unparsimonious.

Keywords

Source InternalismSource ExternalismSource Hybridismpractical reasonspractical normativitypractical deliberationnormative weight
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , April 2015 , pp. 159 - 178
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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