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The Proof of Utility and Equity in Mill's Utilitarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

John Marshall
John Marshall*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Extract

This is yet another study of Mill's ‘proof’ of utilitarianism, and since the topic is by now rather shop-worn I should state right off what new form I hope to give to it. Mill argues from the premise that each person desires his own happiness to the conclusion that the general happiness is desirable. To be more precise, he argues that one's own happiness is the only thing that any person desires as an end, and from this he moves to the conclusion that the general happiness is that state of things which should be promoted. It is not necessary at the outset to accept this as the correct rendering of Mill's argument; it is part of my object to show that it is.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , September 1973 , pp. 13 - 26
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1973

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References

1 Mill, says that these are strictly speaking precepts, not assertions “which do not express themselves in the indicative, but in the imperative mood.” Mill's Ethical Writings, ed. Scheewind, J. B. Collier Books, p. 159.Google Scholar

2 Ibid., p. 166.

3 Ibid., p. 319.

4 Ibid., p. 291.

5 In his introduction to Mill's Ethical Theory, Schneewind writes:

“Mill says that the duty of society to treat equally well all who have deserved well of it and to be impartial in bestowing its benefits is a ‘direct emanation’ from the Greatest Happiness principle. He thinks that Bentham's dictum, ‘Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one,’ is not something added to the principle of utility but is a mere ‘explanatory commentary’ on it, and that, consequently, no additional account of the principle of impartiality is needed. But this argument fails to meet the point. Bentham's dictum can be taken in two senses. It may mean, ‘Count everybody's happiness according to amount and nobody's for more than its actual amount, when you are calculating what will be the right thing to do,’ and in this sense Mill is right in saying that the dictum is not an addition to the Utilitarian principle, but is merely another way of saying that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable. But Bentham's dictum may also mean, ‘When you are distributing happiness, count everyone for one and no one for more than that’—in other words, ‘Spread it around in equal shares.’ Now it is this stronger sense of the dictum which is required to account for our belief in the obligation to work for a fair division of the goods of life, but this stronger sense is not a mere comment on the Utilitarian principle …. Mill offers no other argument to show that the principle of justice is merely a gloss on the Utilitarian principle and not a separate fundamental principle. In view of the fact that a situation is conceivable in which a just distribution of good would cause the total amount of good to be lower than an unjust distribution, it seems likely that the principle of justice must be held to be a separate principle which may come into conflict with the Utilitarian principle.” (pp. 36–37).

6 The Bobbs-Merill Co., Inc., (Indianapolis, 1966), pp. 35–44.

7 Five Types of Ethical Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 252.