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Pure Moorean Propositions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2020

Roy A. Sorensen
Roy A. Sorensen*
Affiliation:
University of Delaware, Newark, DE19716
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Extract

This paper is devoted to a solution to Moore's problem. After explaining what Moore's problem is and after considering the main approaches toward solving the problem, I provide a definition of Moorean sentences in terms of pure Moorean propositions. My solution to Moore's problem essentially involves a description of how one can contradict oneself without uttering a contradiction, and a set of definitions that exactly determines which sentences are Moorean and which are close relatives of Moorean sentences.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , September 1985 , pp. 489 - 505
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1985

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Footnotes

•

This paper is a slightly modified version of the third chapter of my dissertation ‘Moore's Problem and the Prediction Paradox’. I thank two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier draft.

References

1 Cohen's appeared in Mind, LVIV, 1950) 85-7.

2 Deutscher, Max ‘Bonney on Saying and Disbelieving,’ Analysis, 27, (1967) 184–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Williams's article appeared in Analysis, 39, (1979) 141-2

4 Hintikka, Jaakko Knowledge and Belief, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1962) 90–1Google Scholar

5 Cole's article appeared in Philosophical Studies, 36, (1979) 319-31