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Racist Acts and Racist Humor

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael Philips
Michael Philips*
Affiliation:
Portland State University
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Extract

Racist jokes are often funny. And part of this has to do with their racism. Many Polish jokes, for example, may easily be converted into moron jokes but are not at all funny when delivered as such. Consider two answers to ‘What has an I.Q. of 1007’: (a) a nation of morons; or (b) Poland. Similarly, jokes portraying Jews as cheap, Italians as cowards, and Greeks as dishonest may be told as jokes about how skinflints, cowards, or dishonest people get on in the world. But they are less funny as such (at least if one is not Jewish, Greek, or Italian). As this suggests, racist humor is ‘put down’ humor. We laugh, in part, because we find put-downs funny, sometimes even if they are about us. In many contexts, this tendency is relatively harmless; indeed, within reason, it may be therapeutic to join others in a good laugh at oneself. Why, then, all the commotion about racist humor?

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 1984 , pp. 75 - 96
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1984

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References

1 I am using ‘mistreatment’ in (b) to include any morally objectionable injury to someone's interests. Note that ‘harm’ is not sufficient here. Affirmative Action, for example, may harm White males in virtue of their race, but is not ‘reverse racism’ unless it can be established that it mistreats them. I use ‘harm’ instead of ‘mistreatment’ in condition (a) to avoid counter-examples in which A acts within his rights by harming B, but would not harm B were B's race different (e.g. White landlord A evicts Black tenant B for delinquency in paying the rent, but would not do so were B White). Although I would argue that this constitutes mistreatment, I do not want my criteria to depend on the arguable point that one may mistreat someone by choosing to exercise one's rights.

2 Moreover, there are cases in which we cannot justifiably condemn the racist for his feelings and beliefs. For the feelings may be consequences of the beliefs and the beliefs may be those that any normal person in her position would adopt. Consider, for example, the adolescent who grows up in a highly racist community. It may well be that everyone she respects in that community holds racist beliefs. And it may also be that the limited experience she has in relation to the victimized group tends to confirm these beliefs (suppose, e.g., she works in aliqour store that sells largely to poor Blacks). Now that the mass media has developed some degree of racial consciousness, of course, it is very likely that most such persons will also be exposed to countervailing views. But her authorities in the relevant community may have ways of discounting the media (e.g., by claiming that it is run by Communists and Jews). And if the adolescent in question does not read very well - indeed, if she lacks the proper research skills — she really hasn't the resources to determine whom to trust. In this case it is difficult to see how she could be blamed for holding the beliefs she holds. On the other hand, the greater her exposure to ‘recalcitrant data’ the more we have a right to expect her to reevaluate her beliefs. Racist societies typically discourage such reevaluations by formally or informally punishing those who undertake them; and, as a consequence of this, many people have a strong tendency to overlook data that conflicts with their racist beliefs when they encounter them (and a tendency to weigh confirming instances relatively more heavily than disconfirming instances). Given the consequences of these beliefs for action, however, these tendencies are morally objectionable. Where there is the opportunity for knowledge on such serious matters, ignorance is blameworthy. In any case, it is important to emphasize that whether or not we regard P's possession of such beliefs as blameworthy, we are entitled to condemn the actions that flow from them as racist, and therefore, as prima facie wrong. Again, our reason for this is that these actions victimize or are intended to victimize members of the relevant ethnic group.

3 To deny this is to fail to take wrongs seriously. Philosophers and bureaucrats sometimes do this. So long as an action is judged right, all things considered, there is a tendency on the part of some to deny that anyone is wronged by it. But this is mistaken. Suppose that we must jail an innocent person for two weeks to prevent a vendetta very likely to kill scores. Most of us, I think, would take this to be the right action. But isn't it also clear that the jailed party has been wronged? To deny this is to deny: (a) that we owe this person some recompense, and (b) that we have a reason to regret the jailing of this person that we would not have were he guilty of some offense. It seems to me, however, that not to accept (a) and (b) is to endorse ruthlessness.

4 It is worth noting that given the social hiatus between victimizing and victimized groups in racist societies stereotypes need little confirmation to achieve widespread belief. Partly as a result of this social chasm confirming instances of a stereotype are far more accessible than disconfirming instances. Consider the Italian gangster stereotype, i.e., the view that most Italians are linked to organized crime. The confirming instances - Mafia personnel - are in the public eye. But it seems likely that those who take this stereotype seriously do not know many Italians personally, and have no way of knowing whether or not the Italians with whom they have contact (e.g., grocery store and restaurant owners) are connected with the Mafia.

5 Although such jokes may contribute to the sense of inferiority often suffered by members of victimized races. And when this occurs it could be said that they promote the belief that such people are inferior.

6 Of course, Washington could be an established character who, in effect, represented a Black ‘type’ or Blacks in general. Were this the case, the joke in question might be racist. Whether or not it is would depend, e.g., on what else is true of Washington as a character, and perhaps, on where the joke appears (e.g., whether in a predominantly Black or a predominantly White publication). Note that members of a victimized group are far less likely to mistake a survival strategy for a character trait than members of a victimizing group.