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Reason and trust in Reid
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Abstract
My theme in this essay is the anti-rationalism in Reid's thought. I explore three areas of Reid's thought in which anti-rationalism is a prominent feature: Reid's attack on the Way of Ideas and his own account of how beliefs are formed, in particular, perceptual beliefs, his response to the skeptic, and his understanding of the task of the philosopher.
- Type
- Epistemology
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 41 , Issue S1: New Essays on Reid , July 2011 , pp. 183 - 196
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Authors 2011
References
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