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Shared intentions, public reason, and political autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Blain Neufeld
Blain Neufeld*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, USA
*
Blain Neufeld blain.neufeld@gmail.com
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Abstract

John Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing upon an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of public reason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by a ‘constrained proceduralist’ account of democratic self-government, or the ‘convergence’ account of public justification formulated recently by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier.

Keywords

Michael Bratmancivic respectGerald Gauspolitical autonomypolitical liberalismpublic reasonshared intentionsJohn RawlsKevin Vallier
Type
Original Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 6 , September 2019 , pp. 776 - 804
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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