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Skookumchuck, Kiidk’yaas, Gibbard: normativity, meaning, and idealization (critical notice of Allan Gibbard Meaning and Normativity)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Adam Morton*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia Department of Philosophy, 1866 Main Mall E370, Vancouver, BC, CanadaV6T 1Z11

Abstract

Gibbard argues that ‘meaning is normative’. He explains the claim with an account of the normative which bases it on the process of planning, taken in part as issuing instructions to oneself. It seems to entail that the right kind of plans make norms. One ought to continue adding with plus rather than quus in a Kripkenstein horror story. I focus on Gibbard’s characterization of normativity: it is not what one might expect. The main purpose of this review article is to present the way of understanding normativity that makes most sense of what he says, and which makes some otherwise implausible assertions defensible and perhaps even true. I give reasons for thinking that Gibbard’s understanding of normativity-through-plans cannot do the work he wants it to. I also argue that he is onto something right, and it opens interesting new questions.

Type
Critical Notice
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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