as Plato is using the term throughout this passage. The closest sense is probably that expressed by the French ‘le langage’, as that term is used in recent linguistic studies. Cf. 
immediately following the presentation of the second stage of the argument.
, like English ‘say’, has inter alia the two senses: (i) to say or speak, i.e. to utter an articulate sound, and (ii) to mean or intend, i.e. to have a definite signification. Cf. LSI. s.v. III, esp. 1 and 9. The sense mean is probably predominant in this occurrence of 
, but the ambiguous ‘says’ is used in this translation as it has a better sound in English at this point.
(et non, où) s’explique comme se rapportant non à l’ensemble de la phrase, mais 
(cf. plus loin 
).” But surely he cannot be referring to 
in the fourth line! yet there are no other occurrences of 
with any negative in the rest of the dialogue!
, but in not speaking at all 
was apparently not understood on the analogy of 
.
is used to distinguish the conditions for unsuccessful speaking, from those for successful. The latter are given in the complex statement 
and the former by the negation of this whole set of conditions in the expression quoted. Yet no one would expand the statement of them as 
cannot automatically be taken as adverbial, and called attention to the alternative interpretation according to which the 
is taken as “veridical” in C H. Kahn’s sense. (This sense of 
is discussed inf., in note 20.)
, e.g., in Protagoras or Aristotle. Plato, however, often seems to play on the alternative construction (taking 
as adverb rather than as conjunction) and thus to take the formula as meaning: “to speak of the things which are just as they are.. .”.”[Italics added.)
is identical in form, whichever function it may have, and our contemporary distinction between the conjunction ‘that’ and the adverb ‘as’, cannot be urged with equivalent force in Classical Greek. But in any case, evidence that the expressions function adverbially in the present ococurrences, is provided by parallel contexts: in the Euthydemus, where Plato first raises the issue (as discussed at the end of Part I of this paper), the expressions occupying the corresponding position in the statement suggesting how false speaking should be described, are 
, and can only be adverbial: also, later in the Cratylus where Plato examines the relationship between speaking (and naming), and reality, by mean* of the craft analogy (3B7A sqq.), he uses adverbial expressions in similar positions in his statements assessing the various ways that speaking and naming can be carried out (cf. e.g. 
.
, from a privative and the stem of 
escaping notice; according to which derivation, truth is literally not-escaping notice, not-concealed, un-hidden, etc. Cf. LSJ s.v. 
.
is understood as 
(viz. Hesiod, Theogony 233), has to do with the [epistemologica!) characteristic of not-forgetting or not-neglecting. He notes, moreover, that the essential contrary to truth was, for the Creeks, always, lying, deception, conscious distortion, etc.—in short, everything that disturbs, distorts, slants, or conceals the true and real.
.
ask in prayers for health from the gods 
and do not know that they have in themselves the power for this 
.
, which the gods are responsible for, and discovering 
, which mortals may undertake. But these may be just two aspects of the traditional disclosure which is wholly within the purview of the gods alone: for in B34 Xenophanes seems to be suggesting that even if a mortal 
were. Quite by accident 
. to utter the most complete [truth] 
he would not even realize it himself
(and of the Indo-European *es). This “veridical” usage, as he designates it on p.252, is not simply to be or to exist, but to be so (p.250); and is essentially ambiguous, meaning to be true with respect to statements made in words, and to be the case with respect to facts or situations in the world (p.252). Kahn further explains that the ambiguity is likely based on the one-to-one correspondence between what is the case and the truth of the statement that it is the case (p.252).
correctly: e.g. Fowler by ‘speech’, Mendier by ‘le discours’, Apelt by ‘die Rede’. It is commentators, such as those mentioned at the beginning of this paper, who create the erros in their analyses of the argument. This is evidence that the errors are the result of interpretation, i.e. of bringing presuppositions to the reading of Plato, rather than looking at what he actually said.
into his discussion, as though it occurred in the original text. This is surprising in that his article (“On Plato’s Cratylus”, J. Philol., 1888, pp.192-218) is one of the more insightful studies of the Cratylus that has appeared.
cannot here mean whole in the sense of structured eniity or organic whole, for then the rest of step five would not make sense. Meridier, perhaps aware of this, renders, ‘dans l’ensemble’; Apelt, ‘als Ganzes’.
—204E), and, though suggesting that the whole differs in being a unitary conception distinct from the sum of the parts 
—204A), he argues that since both totality and whole are that from which nothing is lacking, they are identical (205A)! This is, of course, not to deny that he may have been aware of the distinction without working it. out explicitly. It is presupposed, for example, in the doctrine of the 
or virtues in the Republic, and figures in the difference between moderation and justice: the former is the appropriate or peculiar virtue of each citizen and each division of the soul individually, and permits each to keep to its own function; the latter is the appropriate virtue of the lot collectively—the state and the soul—and consists in facilitating circumstances in which each individual or division can perform its own function.
is composed of combinations of two kinds of words: 
and 
and the smallest such combination is a 
, the shortest form of discourse 
—262C). But at this point in the Cratylus he seems to treat both sentences and words as the same in being Dits of discourse, and differing only with respect to the size of the bits. He does not appear to attach any special significance to the fact that the bigger bits are composed of a minimum of two different types of smaller bits, nor even to distinguish such types, though later in the dialogue, at 431B, he does say that 
in that passage may be sentences.
is that which 
and an 
can bespoken in both kinds of 
it would seem that
in 
would 
and
would also 
.
is discovered to be of the sort which reveals the nature or the being of things, and in 430O Plato equates the correct assignment of names to things, with their true assignment, and incorrect with false.
as being a part of the 
But he, too, describes the argument as involving fallacious reasoning, because Socrates seems to “be attributing logical correctness [sic.] not to judgement, but to 
.
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