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The unity of moral attitudes: recipe semantics and credal exaptation*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Derek Shiller
Derek Shiller*
Affiliation:
Independent Scholar, New York City, NY, USA
*
Email: dcshiller@gmail.com
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Abstract

This paper offers a noncognitivist characterization of moral attitudes, according to which moral attitudes count as such because of their inclusion of moral concepts. Moral concepts are distinguished by their contribution to the functional roles of some of the attitudes in which they can occur. They have no particular functional role in other attitudes, and should instead be viewed as evolutionary spandrels. In order to make the counter-intuitive implications of the view more palatable, the paper ends with an account of the evolution of normative judgments as exaptations of the cognitive structures that underlie beliefs.

Keywords

NoncognitivismFrege-Geach problemlanguage of thoughtmoral evolution
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 3-4: Special issue: Representation and Evaluation , 2018 , pp. 425 - 446
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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Footnotes

*

This paper benefitted from comments by Adam Thompson, Derek Baker, David Faraci, Tristram McPherson, William Melanson, and two anonymous referees, as well as audiences at the Philosopher's Cocoon and Minds Online conferences.

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