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Utilitarianism and Moral Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

R.B. Brandt
R.B. Brandt*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
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Extract

Virtually all philosophers now agree that human beings - and possibly the higher animals - have moral rights in some sense, both special rights against individuals to whom they stand in a special relation (such as a creditor's right to collect from a debtor), and general rights, against everybody or against the government, just in virtue of their human nature. Some philosophers also think, however, that anyone who is a utilitarian ought not to share this view: there is a fundamental incompatibility between utilitarinism and human rights. Most utilitarians, of course, have not thought there is such an incompatibility. John Stuart Mill, for instance, espoused utilitarianism at the same time that he defended rights to free speech and freedom of action except where it injures others. In what follows I wish to explore some reasons recently put forward to show that the utilitarian who wishes to affirm that there are moral rights faces a serious logical problem; and I shall argue that further analysis shows the alleged difficulty is unreal.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 1984 , pp. 1 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1984

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References

1 Posner, Richard A. ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory,’ Journal of Legal Studies, 8 (1979) 103-40CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Hare, R.M.. ‘What is Wrong with Slavery?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs. 8 (1978-79) 103-21.Google Scholar See also Lyons, David’ remarks in ‘Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments.’ in Daniels, Norman ed., Reading Rawls (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1975) 141-67.Google Scholar

3 Lyons, David ‘Utility as a Possible Ground of Rights.’ Nous. 14 (1980) 19CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Ibid., and ‘Utility and Rights.’ in Pennock, J.R. and Chapman, J.W. eds., Ethics, Economics. and the Law. Nomos XXIV. (New York: New York University Press 1982)Google Scholar

5 Lyons. ‘Utility and Rights.’ 131

6 Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism, ch. 5Google Scholar

7 Gibbard, Allan Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 7 (1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982)

9 Hare, R.M. ‘Utility and Rights,’ in Pennock, J.R. and Chapman, J.W. eds., Ethics, Economics and the Law, Nomos XXIV (New York: New York University Press 1982)Google Scholar

10 Ibid.

11 Hare, R.M. Moral Thinking, 155Google Scholar

12 Hare, R.M. ‘Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism,’ in Lewis, H.D. ed., Contemporary British Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin 1976), 113-32Google Scholar

13 Ibid., 129; cf. also Moral Thinking, 45.

14 Hare, ‘Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism.’ 127

15 Hare, Moral Thinking, 59; but cf. also 51-2.

16 Hare, Moral Thinking, 176

17 Hare, Moral Thinking, 132-64

18 Hare, ‘Utility and Rights’