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Utilitarianism, Supererogation and Future Generations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

R. I. Sikora
R. I. Sikora*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
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Extract

I shall argue here that the reason supererogatory acts are not obligatory is that they require too much personal sacrifice, and that in order for an act to be supererogatory, it must have a kind of result that you would have an obligation to bring about if you could do so with no personal sacrifice. I further argue that traditional utilitarianism should be modified so as not to treat supererogatory acts as obligatory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , September 1979 , pp. 461 - 466
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1979

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References

1 I am using “sacrifice” in a broader way than usual. I shall say that someone is making a sacrifice whenever he knowingly acts for the sake of others in a way that entails personal loss for him.

2 “The Repugnant Conclusion”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1977), pp. 745-54.

3 “Utilitarianism: The Classical Principle and the Average Principle”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1975), pp. 409-19.

4 Jonathan Bennett raises other objections to my argument (“On Maximizing Happiness”, in a forthcoming collection of papers, Obligations to Future Generations, ed. Sikora, R. I. and Barry, Brian (Philosophical Monographs, Spring, 1978)Google Scholar), to which I respond in my contribution to the same collection.