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Warmongers, Martyrs, and Madmen versus the Hobbesian Laws of Nature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Andrew I. Cohen
Andrew I. Cohen*
Affiliation:
University of Oklahoma Norman, OK73019-2006USA
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Extract

Hobbes claims all persons agree on the value of the laws of nature and the peace to which they are means. He also sees the laws of nature as the ‘conclusions’ of right reason. But Hobbes argues that right reason in nature is particularized; each agent may decide which reasons govern her conduct. If Hobbes is then to cast the laws of nature as conclusions of right reason, he must either explain why the extent to which right reason in nature is particularized is not such as to impede convergence on the laws of nature, or he must explain why any divergence is irrelevant to the justification of the laws of nature.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , December 2002 , pp. 561 - 586
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2002

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References

1 See, for example, Lev 1.15, 216. Citations to Hobbes's works are ‘Lev‘: Leviathan, C.B. Macpherson, ed. (New York: Penguin Books 1968) (by part, chapter, and page, respectively); ‘El Law‘: The Elements of Law: Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, J.C.A. Gaskin, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press 1994) (by part, chapter, section, and page, respectively); ‘De Cive’ and ‘De Homine‘: Man and Citizen, Bernard Gert, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1991) (each by chapter, section, and page, respectively); ‘Dlge‘: A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 6, Sir William Molesworth, Bart., ed. (London: John Bohn 1840); ‘QCLNC: Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance in Molesworth, Volume 5; ‘Beh‘: Behemoth, Ferdinand Tonnies, ed. (Chicago: University Press 1990).

2 Hobbes casts the laws of nature as the conclusions of reason in Lev 1.13, 188; and 1.14, 189. He describes the laws of nature specifically as conclusions of right reason at De Cive 1.15, 119; 2.1, 122-3 and at El Law 1.14.6, 79.

3 A note on methodology: Hobbes remarks on glory and the laws of nature throughout his corpus; I draw primarily from relevant passages in his three main political works. Throughout the political writings there are more or less constant views about glory seeking and about the conception and function of the laws of nature. I note any relevant differences as I proceed.

4 Hobbes's variable use of terms complicates efforts to produce a complete and consistent picture of his views on right reason. Gregory S. Kavka highlights the interpretative problems in ‘Right Reason and Natural Law in Hobbes's Ethics,‘ Monist 66 (1983), 120-2, and Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton: University Press 1986), 338-9. The outline presented here should be general enough to capture how the basic senses of right reason bear on the laws of nature.

5 Certain representatives of the natural law tradition may fit here. See, for example, Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, 1, Q. 79, Art. 2; 1-2 Q 90 A4, Q 91 A2, Q 94 A2, 4. As Darwall notes of the Hobbesian view: ‘There is no sui generis normative metaphysical order; nor have we a cognitive faculty that might access it if there were’ (Stephen Darwall, ‘Internalism and Agency,’ Philosophical Perspectives 6 [1992], 163).

6 See also Darwall, ‘Internalism and Agency,’ 162: ‘what he [Hobbes] means by right reason is not some faculty of rational intuition, but simply a correct ‘‘reckoning‘’ of consequences.‘

7 See, for example, Lev 1.5, 111, and El Law 2.24.8, 181.

8 Unfettered reason in nature need not be chiefly responsible for pre-political conflict. As Jean Hampton discusses, some Hobbes scholars trace conflict to agents’ unconstrained passions or to their shortsightedness. See Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press 1986), 58-89.

9 The sovereign's reason is artificial because the sovereign itself is an artifice (Lev 2 . 2 1 , 263); the sovereign is not a fixture of nature.

10 Hobbes writes that the sovereign's reason ‘is no otherwise certainly right than by our making it so by our approbation of it and voluntary subjection to it’ (QCLNC, Aminadv. on #14, 193).

11 There are important caveats here regarding the scope of sovereign right reason‘s authoritative jurisdiction. Some sovereign dictates might be inconsistent with other commands or importantly problematic for other reasons. In any such cases the person(s) holding the office of sovereign would not bind subjects’ conduct if his/her/their commands no longer counted as right reason. For further discussion of this issue, see Jean Hampton, Hobbes, ch. 7; and Andrew I. Cohen, ‘Retained Liberties and Absolute Hobbesian Authorization,’ Hobbes Studies 11 (1998) 33-45.

12 For a splendid discussion of competing accounts for how means-end thinking figures in Hobbesian reason, see Mark C. Murphy, ‘Desire and Ethics in Hobbes‘s Leviathan,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2000) 259-68.

13 Here I do not wish to minimize difficulties in presenting a complete notion of Hobbesian reason. Recently, for instance, commentators have much discussed whether and how instrumental considerations bear on purely formal Hobbesian reason. (See, for example, Hampton, Hobbes, 42-51; John Deigh, ‘Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (1996) 33-60; Murphy, ‘Desire and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan‘; Bernard Gert, ‘Hobbes on Reason,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001) 243-57.) For the purposes of this discussion I only suppose that causal considerations bear on the truth-conditions of propositions that some rules are laws of nature. (See Deigh and Murphy for a complete discussion of this issue.) I explore what it means for the normative force of such laws were self-preservation not a high value for all persons.

14 The account at Lev 1.14, 189 makes basically the same point.

15 Hobbes says people call this passion ‘pride’ somewhat disapprovingly; it is called a ‘just valuation of himself’ to those who approve of it. See El Law 1.9.1, 50; Lev 1.8, 140.

16 In A Streetcar Named Desire, Blanche Dubois’ gentility and deluded pretense to social eminence is one example of vainglory. As examples of vainglory Hobbes cites persons who set to preaching when thinking they are Christ. He also mentions the ‘fable by the fly sitting on the axletree, [who says] to himself, What a dust do I raise!‘ (El Law 1.10.9, 63; 1.9.1, 50). The distinction between vainglory and false glory disappears from Leviathan, where Hobbes only distinguishes confidence (as a sort of warranted glory) from vainglory. See Lev 1.6, 125.

17 Strictly speaking, it is not glory per se but the desire for glory that is a source of conflict. See Bernard Gert, ‘Hobbes's Psychology,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, Tom Sorell, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press 1996), 161-2.

18 Gregory S. Kavka, ‘Hobbes's War of All Against All,’ Ethics 93 (1983) 291-310

19 For a related discussion, see Kavka, ‘Hobbes's War of All Against All.‘

20 See similar remarks at El Law 1.16.10, 91-2.

21 Things are more complicated in cases of martyrdom. Martyrs may derive satisfaction from knowing that their lives are to culminate in brutal destruction of their foes. They might also derive satisfaction in knowing that the reputation (and sometimes the financial position) of family and friends will improve in light of their martyrdom. And of course there is the sense of satisfaction that comes from believing in the prospect of rewards in the afterlife. There are further complications given that some religious views do not have agents seeking martyrdom so much as having it thrust upon them. I pass over these difficulties here.

22 Hobbes writes, ‘the Thoughts are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired…’ (Lev 1.8, 139). As Mark C. Murphy argues, it then seems th at reason can be put in servic e of a desire to obtain some end. See Mark C. Murphy, ‘Desire and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan.‘

23 Jean Hampton urges on Hobbes's behalf that by distinguishing ‘real’ from apparent desires, Hobbes has the resources to disqualify as irrational certain declared preferences. See Hobbes, ch. 1. She later expressed misgivings about this view in ‘Hobbes and Ethical Naturalism,’ Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992) 333-53. More on Hampton‘s later concerns in Section VII (below).

24 This is also not to deny problems in reconciling Hobbesian naturalism with a Hobbesian account of instrumental rationality that defers to the findings of a ‘quiet mind.’ Here I merely hope to outline the best case for how Hobbesian reason recommends peace.

25 Recall the earlier discussion of how Hobbes denied that the vainglorious were project pursuers. Though the term ‘vainglory’ tilts toward Hobbes's mistaken interpretation, it is useful enough to capture the notion of persons bent on revenge.

26 I am grateful to an anonymous Referee for suggesting a link between revenge and the vainglorious quest for personal advancement.

27 I am grateful to Clark Wolf for suggesting this example.

28 Hobbesian ethical naturalism may still have serious problems explaining the motivating force of instrumental reason. As Jean Hampton discusses, the normativity of hypothetical imperatives may prove just as mysterious as that of categorical imperatives. See her ‘Hobbes and Ethical Naturalism,’ especially 346ff. In order to explore the limits of Hobbes's view on whether glory is itself against reason, I am prepared to grant that Hobbes might somehow resolve this problem.

29 Jean Hampton unpacks the desire for glory — especially vindictive glory — as a form of self-destructive and self-defeating hatred whereby one uses violence ineffectively and dishonestly to inflate one's sense of one's relative worth. See ‘Hobbesian Reflections on Glory as a Cause of Conflict,’ in The Causes of Quarrel, Peter Caws, ed. (Boston: Beacon Press 1989), 78-96, especially 90-4; see a related discussion in her ‘Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred,’ in Forgiveness and Mercy, Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, ed. (Cambridge: University Press 1988), 60-79. So long as glory seekers do not seek glory for its own sake, Hampton is correct. But as Andrew Altman notes, sometimes people are moved to seemingly senseless violence against others for ‘the simple pleasure of making them suffer’ (‘Glory, Respect, and Violent Conflict,’ in Caws, 123). Altman nevertheless seems prepared to concede that glory is an irrational appetite, but as I discuss below, I am unconvinced.

30 In order to foster a stable social order, most agents would probably need to treat peace as a high value — one not defeasible by most ordinary considerations.

31 See, for example, De Cive 2.18. There are important caveats here stemming from Hobbes's conception of authorized punishment. See Cohen, 38-41.

32 This tracks the familiar distinction Hobbes draws in Lev 1.15 : the laws of nature bind only to a desire (‘in foro interno’), not necessarily to action (‘in foro externo’).

33 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard 1998), 41-9. See also Stephen Darwall, ‘Normativity and Projection in Hobbes,’ Philosophical Review 109 (2000) 313-47, esp. 335-8.

34 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 44. Scanlon acknowledges that the current d esire might ‘be a n in d icator of this [f ut u r e] enjoym en t, b u t the p r esence o f this s t at e does not, in itself, provide an additional reason for action in the way in which desires are supposed to provide reason to bring about their fulfillment’ (ibid.).

35 The expression is Hobbes‘s; he claims ‘metaphysical goodness is but an idle term.‘ QCLNC, amidadv. on 14, 192. See also Lev 1.6, 120. The account here is meant to be neutral between readings of Hobbes as a subjectivist or a projectivist. The subjecti vist re ading , comi ng f rom H am p ton, Kavk a, G authier, and o th ers, s ees value t erms as designating the objects of our appetites. The projectivist version, recently given compelling defense by Stephen Darwall, sees value terms as vehicles for expressing desire. (Stephen Darwall, ‘Normativity and Projection in Hobbes.’) More on Darwall‘s reading below.

36 See, for example, QCLNC, amidadv. on 14, 192.

37 Stephen Darwall casts the laws of nature as empty instrumental truths until we speak of agents who have an ‘inescapable’ desire of self-preservation. Their desire confers practical force on the findings of reason. See The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought‘: 1640-1740 (New York: Cambridge University Press 1995), 58-60. See also ‘Normativity and Projection in Hobbes,’ 335-8.

38 ‘Introduction’ to Man and Citizen, 13. See similar remarks by Gert in ‘Hobbes‘s Account of Reason,’ The Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979) 559-60; and ‘Hobbes on Reason,’ 248.

39 David Boonin-Vail, Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press 1994), 56. S.A. Lloyd also persuasively argues that Hobbesian reason is not necessarily concerned with self-preservation. See Ideals as Interests in Hobbes's Leviathan (New York: Cambridge University Press 1992), 250-4.

40 Boonin-Vail, 55-6

41 ‘Moral Beliefs,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958-9). Reprinted in 20th Century Ethical Theory, Steven M. Cahn and Joram G. Haber, ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall 1995), 373.

42 See the detailed account of this phenomenon by Carl Elliott, ‘A New Way To Be Mad,’ The Atlantic Monthly (December, 2000) 72-84.

43 I am grateful to an anonymous Referee for making this point about the special value of being able-bodied.

44 See, for instance, Lev 1.15, 211; De Cive 3.12, 142; 6.13, 183; 6.11, 179; El Law 1.9.6, 52; Beh, 14-15.

45 Hampton, ‘Hobbes and Ethical Naturalism,’ 343

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., 345

48 Hampton discusses further problems with normativity under subjectivist accounts of value in ibid., especially 346ff.

49 Stephen Darwall, ‘Normativity and Projection in Hobbes.’ Page numbers in the text refer to this article.

50 Darwall's account is certainly richer than the quick summary here may suggest, but this sketch should suffice to motivate how self-preservation is a Hobbesian value.

51 The projectivist account of which considerations qualify as Hobbesian reasons may then be significantly coextensive with the set isolated by subjectivist readings of Hobbes. (Thanks to Kit Wellman for a discussion of these points.) If neither subjectivist nor projectivist readings can discount reasons to seek glory, then we would need further argument (perhaps appealing to a different Hobbesian meta-ethic) to explain how all men by reason conclude that the laws of nature bind them.

52 Robert Shaver writes that on Hobbes's view, ‘virtues or vices are constituted by their connection to peace: A disposition is virtuous provided it conduces to peace. Again, the question of why peace is good need not be answered, provided one finds peace good’ (Rational Egoism [Cambridge: University Press 1999], 37). Darwall claims that a desire for self-preservation is assumed in Hobbes's account. See, for example, Darwall, ‘Normativity and Projection in Hobbes,’ 335-6. Boonin-Vail reads Hobbes‘s ethics as resting on the assumption that ‘most people, most of the time, do in fact rank their own deaths as the greatest possible evil’ (Boonin-Vail, 57). Interestingly, Boonin-Vail does not discuss how we can exclude persons who discount their self-preservation from counting against the normative force of a Hobbesian ethics. Arthur Ripstein has also noted difficulties with generating a Hobbesian political theory without any substantive presuppositions: ‘The Hobbesian contract, no less than its Lockean and Rawlsian offspring, can only serve to justify institutions because it incorporates political conditions we do in fact accept. Insofar as there are other considerations that we do accept, or can be made to accept, the Hobbesian state of nature fails to provide a privileged perspective for social choice’ (‘Foundationalism in Political Theory,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 [1990], 126).

53 Consider the thirst for battle captured in the ‘Four Hussar Songs op. 117,’ esp. #2, ‘Tedious peace‘: ‘Tedious peace/ lasted too long;/ we were separated,/ my trusty sword./ While I was tasting/ the cellar's wines,/ you hung rusting,/ alone on the w a l l . / / I sampled the wine/ vintage by vintage;/ meanwhile the blood/ dried on you./ But at last hot strife/ has flared up, my sword,/ and your moment has come.// I give a bright polish/ to your blade;/ I let you whistle/ your deadly song.// Roar to work/ in a cloud of dust;/ O sabre, we have/ brought each other joy.// Drink deep,/ my thirsty blade,/ of the heady new wine,/ drink from heart to heart.// While you were tasting/ red blood,/ my throat was rusting/ with ardour.’ (It has much more of a demonic singsong quality in the original German.) Lyrics drawn from Nikolaus Lenau, ‘Vier Husarenlieder op. 117 (1851),’ Lionel Salter, trans., as featured in notes to the CD of Schumann's Liederkreis Op. 3 9: Romanzen & Balladen, 2000. Thanks to Ken Merrill for bringing this to my attention.

54 I borrow here from Darwall's account at Darwall, ‘Normativity and Projection in Hobbes,’ 336. It should go without saying that Darwall would not endorse the actions of degenerates.

55 Such judgments simply fall out of the definitions of the relevant terms. See the detailed discussions by Deigh (‘Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan’) and Murphy (‘Desire and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan’).

56 For a related discussion, see Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, 439ff.

57 For a related discussion, see Bernard R. Boxill, ‘How Injustice Pays,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980) 359-71.

58 Thanks to Chris Morris for a discussion of these points.

59 ‘A Contractarian Account of Moral Justification’ in Moral Knowledge, Walter Sinnott- Armstrong and Mark Timmons, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press 1996), 226

60 Kavka points to the great benefits (some material, some psychological) involved in living a moral life in a community with similar minded others. Most persons have reason to be moral, but ‘with respect to some individuals, such as hardened but cautious immoralists or clever psychopaths, the argument may fail.’ Kavka does not see this as jeopardizing the convergence of reason with morality: ‘It is too much to claim that it pays one to be moral, irrespective of one's psychological characteristics. Rather, the argument from internal sanctions supports the prudential rationality of living a moral life for … the vast majority of humankind.’ See ‘The Reconciliation Project,’ in Morality, Reason and Truth, David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds. (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld 1984), 306-7.

61 As Morris writes, ‘Justice satisfies this practical aim if a sufficiently large number of people have reasons and act on them and if the number of defectors is sufficiently small. As long as the proportion of cooperators is large relative to the proportion of noncooperators and there are not too many disadvantaged, justice will help secure the conditions for our well-being’ (‘Justice, Reasons, and Moral Standing,’ in Rational Commitment and Social Justice, Jules L. Coleman and Christopher W. Morris, eds. [New York: Cambridge University Press 1998], 201).

62 One responsibility of the Hobbesian sovereign is to set up public institutions and a cultural climate that fosters respect for the laws of nature. See Lev 2.30. Whether the Hobbesian sovereign is in fact necessary for this task is, of course, another matter.

63 Here I have benefited from Christopher Morris's remarks on the advantages of extending moral standing to all persons regardless of their ability or willingness to participate in reciprocally beneficial relationships. See ‘Justice Reasons, and Moral Standing,’ 196-201.

64 Whether this standard issues from the lips of the sovereign or from the informal norms of public reason is here beside the point. But see Michael Ridge's illuminating discussion of how individuals may enshrine public reason itself as sovereign, without having a traditional Hobbesian sovereign, in ‘Hobbesian Public Reason,‘ Ethics 108 (1998) 538-68.

65 This topic has also been well discussed by others. See Ridge's critique in Ridge, ‘Hobbesian Public Reason.’ See also Gregory Kavka, ‘Hobbes's War of All Against All’; and Hampton, Hobbes.

66 Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the philosophy departments at Ohio University, The University of Oklahoma, West Chester University of Pennsylvania, and The University of Georgia, where I received many helpful comments. I am especially grateful for constructive feedback from Mark Bedau, Hugh Benson, Bernie Boxill, Bob Burton, Harry Dolan, Ray Elugardo, Ed Halper, Victoria Kamsler, Bill Knorpp, Mark LeBar, Ken Merrill, Chris Morris, Jennifer Samp, Stacey Swain, Zev Trachtenberg, Kit Wellman, Clark Wolf, Ray Woller, the editors of this Journal, and two anonymous referees.