Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-14T17:22:54.715Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

What are Thick Concepts?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Matti Eklund
Matti Eklund*
Affiliation:
Cornell University, Sage School of Philosophy, Ithaca, NY14853-3201, USA
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Many theorists hold that there is, among value concepts, a fundamental distinction between thin ones and thick ones. Among thin ones are concepts like good and right. Among concepts that have been regarded as thick are discretion, caution, enterprise, industry, assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, discernment, treachery, promise, brutality, courage, coward, lie, gratitude, lewd, perverted, rude, glorious, graceful, exploited, and, of course, many others. Roughly speaking, thick concepts are value concepts with significant descriptive content. I will discuss a number of problems having to do with how best to understand the notion of a thick concept. Thick concepts have been widely discussed in the metaethical literature. But some important problems concerning what thick concepts are supposed to be have not been squarely addressed even in the most systematic of these discussions. Here I want to highlight these problems.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 25 - 49
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Barker, S.J. 2000. ‘Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicatureヨ’ Analysis 60: 268–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 1992. ‘Morality and Thick Concepts II — Through Thick and Thin.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol. 66: 267–83.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Boghossian, P. 1996. ‘Analyticity Reconsidered.’ Noûs 30: 360–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boghossian, P. 2003. ‘Blind Reasoning.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 78: 225–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandom, R. 2000. Articulating Reasons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Copp, D. 2001. ‘Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.’ Social Philosophy and Policy 18: 1–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dancy, J. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Dancy, J. 1996. ‘In Defense of Thick Concepts.’ In Moral Concepts, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20, French, P.A. Uehling, T.E. Jr. and Wettstein, H.K. eds. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.Google Scholar
Dummett, M. 1981. Frege: Philosophy of Language. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Eklund, M. 2002. ‘Inconsistent Languages.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64: 251–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eklund, M. 2005. ‘What Vagueness Consists In.’ Philosophical Studies 125: 27–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eklund, M. 2007. ‘Meaning-Constitutivity.’ Inquiry 50: 559–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eklund, M. 2010. ‘Review of Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88: 752–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finlay, S. 2005. ‘Value and Implicature.’ Philosophers’ Imprint 5: 1–20.Google Scholar
Foldy, M. 1997. The Trials of Oscar Wilde. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Foot, P. 1958. ‘Moral Arguments.’ Mind 67: 502–13. Reprinted in Virtues and Vices, Oxford: Blackwell 1978.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glass, M. 1973. ‘Philippa Foot's Naturalism: A New Version of the Breakdown Theory in Ethics.’ Mind 82: 417–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurka, T. and Elstein, D.. 2009. ‘From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39: 515–35.Google Scholar
Jackson, F. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1997. ‘Naming the Colours.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 325–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason.’ Monist 62: 331–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, J. 1981. ‘Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following.’ In Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, Holtzman, S. and Leich, C. eds. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
McNaughton, D. and Rawling, P.. 2000. ‘Unprincipled Ethics.’ In Moral Particularism, Hooker, B. and Little, M. eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Priest, G. 1997. ‘Sexual Perversion.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 360–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richard, M. 2008. When Truth Gives Out. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scheffler, S. 1987. ‘Morality Through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.’ Philosophical Review 96: 411–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slote, M. 1975. ‘Inapplicable Concepts and Sexual Perversion.’ In Philosophy & Sex, Baker, R. and Elliston, F. eds. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.Google Scholar
Tappenden, J. 1993a. ‘The Liar and Sorites Paradoxes: Toward a Unified Treatment.’ Journal of Philosophy 90: 550–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tappenden, J. 1993b. ‘Analytic Truth — It's Worse (or Perhaps Better) than You Thought.’ Philosophical Topics 21: 233–261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tappolet, C. 2004. ‘Through Thick and Thin: Good and its Determinates.’ Dialectica 58: 207–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Väyrynen, P. 2009. ‘Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials.’ Philosophical Perspectives 23: 439–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, B. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2003. ‘Understanding and Inference.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. vol. 77: 249–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. 2006. ‘Conceptual Truth.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. vol. 80: 1–41.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. 2009. ‘Reference, Inference and the Semantics of Pejoratives.’ In Essays for David Kaplan, Almog, J. and Leonardi, P. eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar