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What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Ruth Weintraub
Ruth Weintraub*
Affiliation:
Tel-Aviv University, Philosophy Department, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel
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Extract

The mythical hungry ass, facing two identical bundles of hay equidistant from him, has engendered two related questions. Can he choose one of the bundles, there seemingly being nothing to incline him one way or the other? If he can, the second puzzle — pertaining to rational choice — arises. It seems the ass cannot rationally choose one of the bundles, because there is no sufficient reason for any choice.

In what follows, I will argue that choice is possible even when there is no option which is better than the others (section II), and that it is perfectly reasonable to choose an option even when there is no sufficient reason for it (section III). I will then (section IV) point to another puzzling feature of the ass's tale, a seeming difference between it and its theoretical analogue, and consider some suggestions as to how the asymmetry is to be explained (section V).

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 42 , Issue 3-4 , December 2012 , pp. 281 - 301
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

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