Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 1976
In Chapter V of his book Res Cogitans — “On What One Knows” — Zeno Vendler attempts to maintain the thesis that the objects of knowledge and belief are incompatible, i.e., that the immediate object of believing is a picture of reality and “the immediate object of knowing is not a ('true’) picture of reality but reality itself”. We shall
(I) argue that he fails in this attempt because his “incompatibilism” depends on the view that the that-clauses which are the basic verb objects of know and believe are of a type which reflect a distinction between the subjective and objective dimensions of the mental world; and it is exactly this which he does not establish;
and
(II) question the philosophical significance of the wh-nominal.
In Chapter IV — “Propositions” — Vendler tries to draw a distinction between “the subjective and objective dimensions of the mental world”. The subjective dimension corresponds to the world of propositions.
* We should like to thank Mr. Don Mannison and Professor L.C. Holborow of the Department of Philosophy, University of Queensland, for commenting on an early draft of this paper.
1 Vendler, Zeno Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology, Cornell University Press, 1972.Google Scholar
2 Ibid, p. 118.
3 Ibid., p. 81.
4 Ibid, p 99.
5 Ibid, p 95;
Vendler, Zeno Adjectives and Nominalizations,Mouton, The Hague, Paris, 1968, pp. 37–38.Google Scholar
A wh-nominal is a sentence nominalization formed by replacing some element of the sentence to be nominalized, subject, object or adverbial phrase by the appropriate wh-morpheme. For examples, see diagram.
6 Vendler, Zeno Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology, Cornell University Press, 1972, p 97.Google Scholar
7 Ibid, p 98.
8 Ibid, p 99.
9 Ibid, pp 105ft.
10 Ibid, p 108.
11 Ibid, p 111.
12 Ibid, pp 111-112.
13 Ibid, p 112.
14 Ibid, p 46.
15 Ibid, p 67.
16 Ibid, p 109-110.
17 Ibid, pp 114-115.
18 Ibid, pp 114-116.
19 Ibid, p 115.