Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
Major energy policy decisions are usually based in part upon forecasts of energy supply and demand. However an examination of the Canadian National Energy Board's forecasts of natural gas supply and demand over the last decade indicates that these forecasts were not a reliable basis for policy decisions. An analysis of the policy context underlying those forecasts reveals that they were not neutral “best guess” estimates of future supply and demand, but instead closely reflected the policy context and major project proposals of the time. The reasons for this are rooted in the nature of forecasting techniques and the way that they are used by decision-makers. This, it is argued, has important implications for the use of energy forecasting in policy planning.
Les principales décisions de la politique énergétique sont généralement basées sur les prévisions de la demande et de l'approvisionnement énrgétique. Cependant, une étude des prévisions de la demande et de l'approvisionnement en gaz naturel de l'Office nationale de l'énergie durant la dernière décennie indique que ces prévisions n'étaient pas une bas fiable pour des décisions en matière de politique énergétique. Une analyse de contexte sous-jacente à ces prévisions révèle qu'il ne s'agissait pas de prévisions neutres des approvisionnements et de la demande future mais qu'ils reflétaient au contraire fidèlement le contexte de la politique et les principaux projets du temps. Les raisons se trouvent dans la nature des techniques de prévisions et leur utilisation par les preneurs de décisions. Ceci, c'est un fait, a des implications importantes sur l'utilisation des prévisions énergetiques dans la planification des politiques.
1 For graphic illustrations of this tendency see the following National Energy Board publications: Report to the Governor in Council (Ottawa. August 1970), 3–23Google Scholar: Canadian Natural Gas: Supply and Requirements (Ottawa. April 1975), 3. 4, 49, 50Google Scholar: Canadian Oil: Supply and Requirements (Ottawa, February 1977), 9–10Google Scholar: Reasons for Decision: Northern Pipelines Vol. 2 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada. July 1977). 59, 81;Google ScholarCanadian Oil: Supply and Requirements (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, September 1978), 69, 148-50: Canadian Energy Supply and Demand. 1980–2000 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1981). 34. 38. 46. 51. 71. 73. 87. 92.Google Scholar
2 Such wide variability is not limited to the Canadian forecasts discussed here. See Brodman, J. R. and Hamilton, R. E, A Comparison of Energy Projections to 1985 (IEA Monograph No. 1; Paris: International Energy Agency, January 1979)Google Scholar, for a presentation and discussion of 78 international energy supply and demand forecasts which also illustrate great variability.
3 The obvious self-perpetuating nature of this process is what has prompted several commentators to describe energy forecasts as self-fulfilling prophecies. See, for example, Daly, Herman, “Energy Demand Forecasting: Prediction or Planning?” AIP Journal (1976), 4–15.Google Scholar Such a description, however, overlooks the (fortunate) fact that forecasts are often wrong.
4 Because of the closely intertwined nature of federal oil and natural gas policy, it is not meaningful to discuss only the latter.
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24 This proposal, which would carry only American gas from Prudhoe Bay along the Alaska Highway, through the Yukon, British Columbia and Alberta to the United States, was proposed by Foothills because there had not been enough gas found in the Mackenzie Delta to justify their original “Maple Leaf” (all-Canadian) pipeline proposal.
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