Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
One of the most distinctive concepts for the study of public policy in Canada is that of policy or governing instruments. This article describes the origins of this literature, provides an overview of its theoretical claims, and evaluates some of these claims. It is argued, first, that the literature is too directly tied to particular theories of the state and of the policy-making process and that those ties are both unnecessary and constrain the usefulness of the concept of policy instruments. Second, the treatment of coercion as the central feature differentiating policy instruments is questioned and an alternative formulation is proposed.
Un des concepts les plus distinctifs pour l'analyse de politiques au Canada est l'étude des instruments de la politique gouvernementale. Cet article décrit les origines de ces études, examine les théories sur lesquelles elles sont basées, et évalue leur validité. On démontre d'abord aue ces études sont liées trop étroitement à certaines conceptions précises de l'État et du processus de la formulation de politiques, et que ces liens, nullement nécessaires, diminuent l'utilité de ce concept des instruments de politique. En second lieu, on remet en question le rôle de la contrainte considérée trop souvent comme facteur déterminant dans toute discussion sur ces instruments, et on propose une nouvelle formule.
1 These two terms are used interchangeably in the literature and we will follow this convention in this analysis. However, since one of the purposes of this article is to argue for the importance of the constituency or client for a policy instrument in shaping its characteristics in use, the term governing instrument would seem to be the less desirable of the two because of the implication in the term of an exclusive focus on choices made within the government.
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7 A good overview of this literature can be found in W. T. Stanbury and George Lermer, “Regulation and the Redistribution of Income and Wealth,” Canadian Public Administration 26 (1983), 378–401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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12 Lowi, “Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice,” 301–02. For a discussion of Lowi's work as well as that of others and an attempt to extend the approach to policiesthat do not involve expenditures, see Salisbury, Robert and Heinz, John, “A Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications,” in Sharkansky, Ira (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political Science (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1970), 39–60.Google Scholar
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25 Ibid., 34.
26 Ibid., 13.
27 Ibid., 11.
28 Ibid., 2, 22.
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43 Ibid., 284–93.
44 Ibid., 297–301.
45 Ibid., 297.
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47 For a useful discussion of the privileged position of capital and big business withinpluralist democracies see Lindblom, Charles E., Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977).Google Scholar Also see Panitch, Leo (ed.), The Canadian State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).Google Scholar
48 While Doern and Phidd suggest part of this argument as a qualification to anyassessment of instrument choice, they present it more as a problem of policyco-ordination. While this is undoubtedly true, it is also important as a factor inunderstanding restraints on instrument choice within government and this needsmuch more emphasis than it usually receives. See Doern and Phidd, Canadian Public Policy, 132–33.
49 Doern and Phidd are more guarded and careful in their discussion of the reasonsbehind the choice of a policy instrument, suggesting a range of factors such asideology, constitutional and legal considerations that are important. However, thesefactors are raised more as qualifications to their argument than as central features inthe use of these instruments. See Doem and Phidd, Canadian Public Policy, 131–35.
50 Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory,” 690ff.
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58 Chandler, “The Politics of Public Enterprise,” 206ff.
59 Stanbury and Fulton, “Suasion as a Governing Instrument,” 284ff.