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Regional Ministers, National Policies and the Administrative State in Canada: The Regional Dimension in Cabinet Decision-Making, 1980–1984*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Herman Bakvis
Herman Bakvis
Affiliation:
Dalhousie University
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Abstract

Regional ministers, it is said, have declined in importance over the past three decades. While granting the disappearance of figures whose influence spanned broad regions, this article argues that in the last cabinet of Pierre Trudeau (1980–1984) the regional minister system was to a degree revived and formalized within the context of cabinet decision-making. The impact of this system is examined with respect to regional development and employment creation programmes. To account for the renewed influence of regional ministers, attention is focussed on changes in the machinery of government and on the political and economic climate of the time. The case of one minister in particular, Lloyd Axworthy, suggests that a contemporary regional minister's success is dependent primarily on the ability to mobilize the resources of the administrative state.

Résumé

On dit que l'importance de ministres régionaux a diminué pendant les trois dernières décennies. Tout en admettant que l'ère des personnages dont l'influence s'est exercée sur de grandes régions soit révolue, l'article soutient que le dernier Gouvernement de Pierre Trudeau (1980–1984) a revivifié en partie le système de ministres régionaux et sa formalisation dans le processus de décision du cabinet. L'article examine les implications de ce système au niveaux du développement régional et de la création de l'emploi. La croissance de l'influence des ministres régionaux est vue sous l'angle des changement survenus dans l'appareil gouvernemental et du l'atmosphere politique et économique de la période. Le cas de Lloyd Axworthy indique que le succès d'un ministre régional dans la période contemporaine dépend en premier lieu de sa capacité de mobiliser les ressources de l'appareil administratif de l'État.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 21 , Issue 3 , September 1988 , pp. 539 - 567
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1988

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References

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26 McRoberts, Kenneth “Unilateralism, Bilateralism and Multilateralism: Approaches to Canadian Federalism,” in Simeon, Richard (ed.), Intergovernmental Relations, Research Studies of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, vol. 63 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for Supply and Services Canada, 1985), 71–129.Google Scholar

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33 Savoie, “The Toppling of DREE and the Prospects for Regional Economic Development,” 334.

34 Aucoin and Bakvis, “Regional Responsiveness and Government Organization,” 78–80.

35 On the role of regional ministers in this programme, see Report of the Auditor- General of Canada: Fiscal Year Ended 31 March 1986 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1986)Google Scholar, paras. 6.36 through 6.49 and exhibit 6.3. See also Lome Nystrom's question in the House of Commons on February 13, 1984 (Debates, 1317).

36 Government of Canada, Special Recovery Capital Projects Program: The First Year (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1984).Google Scholar On the role of regional ministers see Thomas, “The Role of Party Caucuses,” 106, and especially Egan, James “The Politics of Priority Management: An Examination of the Special Recovery Capital Projects Program,” M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1987.Google Scholar

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40 Evidence of the enmity generated within the Department of Transport came to light after Axworthy's departure. A number of civil servants who had worked directly in the minister's office were subsequently reassigned to menial duties or fired outright. See “Partisan tag is not fair, workers say,” Globe and Mail, October 4, 1984Google Scholar, and “As dust settles from PC sweep, packing begins,” Globe and Mail, October 8, 1984.Google Scholar

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48 Interview with J.-L. Pepin, November 28, 1985. Apparently this was the only cabinet committee meeting which political aides to ministers were allowed to attend.

49 See “That Elusive Western Fund,” Western Producer, October 23, 1981.

50 The amount committed through Transport Canada to sub-agreements under the Manitoba Economic and Regional Development Agreement was considerably larger than those committed to comparable sub-agreements with the other provinces (in millions): $149 (Manitoba), $112 (Newfoundland), $85 (Quebec), $63 (New Brunswick), $25 (PEI). See Department of Regional Industrial Expansion, “Economic and Regional Development Agreements: Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding as of August 30, 1985.”

51 Skogstad, GraceThe Politics of Agricultural Policy-making (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 142–48;Google Scholar and Barry Wilson, “Killing the Crow Rate: Government Salesmen, Media Messengers,” paper submitted to the Canadian Studies Programme, Carleton University, November 1984.

52 Axworthy's mobilization of his portfolios was no mean achievement, given the difficulties other ministers have had in imparting strong political direction to their departments. See, for example, MacDonald, Flora“The Minister and the Mandarins,” Policy Options 1 (September-October 1980), 29–31.Google Scholar Axworthy's case does not fit the models on the role of ministers and policy innovation outlined by Atkinson, Michael M. and Coleman, William D.“Bureaucrats and Politicians in Canada: An Examination of the Political Administration Model,” Comparative Political Studies 18 (1985), 58–80;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and by Johnson, Andrew F.“A Minister as an Agent of Policy Change,” Canadian Public Administration 24 (1981), 612–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The closest parallel appears to be with Lloyd George who, according to A. J. P. Taylor, “is said to have been the only minister of modern times who could defeat the obstinacy even of treasury officials. Usually, however, he preferred to circumvent them. He carried his private secretaries with him from one department to another..., culminating, when he was prime minister, in the creation of a duplicate civil service dependent on himself” (quoted in Mallory, “The Minister's Office Staff,” 32, note 14).

53 Based on data provided by the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion, “General Development Agreements: Status of Subsidiary Agreements as of June 28, 1985,” and projected Economic and Regional Development Agreement expenditures, “Economic and Regional Development Agreements as of August 30, 1985.”

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56 See note 41. The dollar amounts in Table 1 are for the period 1982–1985. For the period 1982–1986 the total amount was $204.7 million of which 96 per cent was spent in the form of grants rather than contributions.

57 Most of the disputes between Axworthy and the city were over the management of the Core Area Initiative. They culminated in the departure of the first director of the Initiative and his proposed replacement in June 1984. See “Norrie alleges ‘patronage’ bid for job,” Winnipeg Free Press, September 4, 1984.Google Scholar

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59 Aucoin and Bakvis, “Regional Responsiveness and Government Organization,” 77–80, 92–95.

60 Thomas, “The Role of National Party Caucuses,” 102–03.

61 Interviews with senators Romeo LeBlanc (March 24, 1986) and Pierre De Bané (April 2, 1986). Axworthy also had good links with DRIE minister Ed Lumley, from Cornwall, Ontario, with whom he regularly traded programme items.

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