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“Appropriate and Just in the Circumstances”: Public Policy and the Enforcement of Rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Christopher P. Manfredi
Christopher P. Manfredi
Affiliation:
McGill University
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Abstract

The political value of rights depends on the availability of effective instruments for remedying violations of those rights. Recognizing this, the authors of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provided courts with three remedial alternatives for enforcing its provisions. Focusing on section 24(1) of the Charter, which permits courts to impose any remedy they consider “appropriate and just in the circumstances, ” this article assesses how Canadian courts have dealt with the remedial dilemmas inherent in Charter litigation. This assessment unfolds in three stages. First, it sets out a framework for analyzing remedial decision-making. Next, it summarizes the cases in which section 24(1) has been explicitly invoked to enforce Charter rights. Finally, the article examines the remedial implications of judicial enforcement of minority- language educational rights.

Résumé

La valeur politique des droits dépend de l'existence d'instruments qui permettent de lutter efficacement contre la violation de ces droits. Reconnaissant ce fait, les auteurs de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés ont fourni aux tribunaux trois instruments de réparation pour faire appliquer ces règlements. Axé sur le paragraphe 24(1) de la Charte qui autorise les tribunaux à prendre les mesures qu'ils jugent «appropriéees et justes dans les circonstances », cet article étudie la façon dont les tribunaux canadiens ont fait face au dilemme inhérent aux litiges découlant de la Charte. Cette évaluation se fait en trois étapes. Dans un premier temps, élle dtablit un cadre pour l'analyse des décisions de redressement. Dans un deuxième temps, elle résume les causes à propos desquelles le paragraphe 24(1) a été explicitement invoqué pour faire respecter les droits découlant de la Charte. Dans un troisième temps, elle analyse les répercussions de l'application juridique des droits à l'éducation dans une langue minoritaire.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 27 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 435 - 463
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1994

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References

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18 In addition to parties directly affected by legislation, standing may be granted to any genuinely interested citizen who raises a serious constitutional issue concerning a statute's validity whenever there is no other reasonable and effective means for bringing the issue before the courts. On standing, seeGibson, Dale and Gibson, Scott, “Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” in Beaudoin, Gerald-A. and Ratushny, Ed, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (2nd ed.; Toronto: Carswell, 1989), 786–794Google Scholar. On intervener status, see Welch, Jillian, “No Room at the Top: Interest Group Intervenors and Charter Litigation in the Supreme Court of Canada,” University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 43 (1985), 204–231Google Scholar. The most comprehensive study of interest group intervention in Charter cases is Ian Brodie, “Interest Groups and the Charter: Interveners at the Supreme Court of Canada” (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Calgary, 1992).

19 Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, 38-45.

20 Wald, Michael S., “Thinking About Public Policy toward Abuse and Neglect of Children: A Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child,” Michigan Law Review 78 (1980), 678–679CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, 44.

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22 See Wasby, Stephen L., “Civil Rights Litigation By Organizations: Constraints and Choices,” Judicature 68 (1985), 345–350Google Scholar.

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25 Eisenstat Weinrib, Lorraine, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter,” Supreme Court Law Review 10 (1988), 486Google Scholar.

26 Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, 45. See also Strayer, Barry, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts: The Function and Scope of Judicial Review (Toronto: Butterworth's, 1983), 56–57Google Scholar.

27 Wolf, Eleanor, Trial and Error: The Detroit School Segregation Case (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), 259–260Google Scholar; Elliott, Rogers, Litigating Intelligence: IQ Tests, Special Education, and Social Science in the Courtroom (Dover: Auburn House, 1987)Google Scholar; Marvell, Thomas, Appellate Courts and Lawyers: Information Gathering in the Adversary System (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), 184Google Scholar; Lieberman, Jethro K., ed., The Role of Courts in American Society: Final Report of the Council on the Role of Courts (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1984), 148Google Scholar; Rossum, Ralph A., “The Problem of Prison Crowding: On the Limits of Prison Capacity and Judicial Capacity,” Benchmark 1 (1984), 23Google Scholar; and Davis, Peggy C., “’There is a Book Out…’: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts,” Harvard Law Review 100(1987), 1539–1604CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 Manzer, Ronald, “Public Policy-Making as Practical Reasoning,” this JOURNAL 17 (1984), 588Google Scholar.

29 Kernaghan, Kenneth and Siegal, David, Public Administration in Canada (2nd ed.; Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1991), 118Google Scholar. Other disadvantages of incrementalism are discussed in Goodin, Robert E., Political Theory and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 19–38Google Scholar.

30 Horowitz. The Courts and Social Policy, 36.

31 Wood, Remedial Law, 89-91.

32 For a discussion of when US federal courts may disengage from monitoring desegregation orders, see Freeman v. Pitts, 118 L.Ed. 2d 108 (1992).

33 Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, 51.

34 Re Phillips and Lynch (1986), 27 D.L.R. (4th) 156.

35 Ibid., 159.

36 Schacter v. The Queen (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 525 (F.C.T.D).

37 Ibid., 548.

38 Schacter v. The Queen (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 635,652 (F.C.A).

39 Schacter v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), Supreme Court of Canada, File No. 21889, July 9, 1992.

40 A.-G. Canada v. Haig (1992), 94 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.).

41 Of course some of the data in Table 1 run counter to this inference. In particular, the success rate of remedial decree cases in the Supreme Court (which presumably decides only the most important cases) is extremely high, and the success rate in the Federal Court of Appeal is higher than in the Federal Court, Trial Division. One explanation for these anomalies is the small number of cases from these jurisdictions in the sample. A second explanation, specific to the Federal Court, is that the Federal Court of Appeal handles automatic, direct appeals of decisions by federal administrative agencies. These appeals involve administrative procedures and are not vetted for policy significance.

42 The number of cases and success rates in these two tables differ from each other and from Table 1 because individual cases often encompass claims involving multiple Charter categories and remedy types.

43 For example, Cheema v. Ross (1991), 82 D.L.R. (4th) 213 (B.C.C.A); Commission des Ecoles Fransaskoise v. Saskatchewan (1991), 81 D.L.R (4th) 88 (Sask. C.A); Cuddy Chicks v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board) (1991), 81 D.L.R. (4th) 121 (SCC); Gerrard v. Saskatoon (1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 767 (Sask. C.A); Hurley v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) (1989), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 472 (Ont. H.C.J); Latimer v. Canada (Treasury Board) (1992), 87 D.L.R. (4th) 333 (FCA); Moore v. British Columbia (1988), 50 D.L.R. (4th) 29 (B.C.C.A); R, v. Creenbaum (1991), 77 D.L.R. (4th) 334 (Ont. C.A); and R. v. King (1988), 50 D.L.R. (4th) 564 (Ont. C.A).

44 Law Society of British Columbia v. Lawrie (1992), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 540 (B.C.C.A); Minto Construction v. Ontario (Regional Assessment Commissioner) (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 52 (Ont. H.C.J); and R. v. Genereux (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 110 (SCC). A typical case might involve a challenge to differential time limitations for different types of civil claims.

45 Egan v. Canada (1992), 87 D.L.R. (4th) 320 (FCTD); Haig v. Canada (1992), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 617 (Ont. Ct. G.D.); Re Hardie and District ofSummerland (1986), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 258 (B.C.S.C); and Schacter v. Canada (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 635 (FCA). Charter claims were successful in Haig, Hardie and Schacter.

46 These two cases (Egan and Haig) both involved the denial of benefits on the basis of sexual orientation. The potential policy impact of successful Charter claims in this area should be obvious.

47 Bain v. The Queen (1992), 87 D.L.R. (4th) 449 (SCC).

48 Governments intervened alone in eight cases, while non-government parties intervened alone in six cases. Both governmental and non-govemmental interveners appeared in five cases. The intervener participation rate of 25 per cent in these cases is significantly lower than the 53 per cent participation rate in all Supreme Court Charter cases. See Brodie, “Interest Groups and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” 43.

49 The full text of section 23, which deals with “minority language educational rights,” is as follows:

23 (1) Citizens of Canada:

(a) whose first language learned and still understood is that of the English

or French linguistic minority population of the province in which they

reside, or

(b) who have received their primary school instruction in Canada in English or French and reside in a province where the language in which they received that instruction is the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province, have the right to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in that language in that province.

(2) Citizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is receiving primary or secondary school instruction in English or French in Canada, have the right to have all their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the same language.

(3) The right of citizens of Canada under subsections (1) and (2) to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of a province

(a) applies wherever in the province the number of children of citizens who have such a right is sufficient to warrant the provision to them out of public funds of minority language instruction; and

(b) includes, where the number of those children so warrants, the right to have them receive that instruction in minority language educational facilities provided out of public funds.

Sections 16 to 22 of the Charter concern the “official languages of Canada,” and deal with the right to use English and French in Parliament and courts established by Parliament, as well as in communicating with federal institutions.

50 See Braen, André, “Les droits scolaires des minorités de langue officielle au Canada et l'interprétation judiciare,” Revue generate de droit 19 (1988), 335–336Google Scholar; and Proulx, Daniel, “La précarité des droits linguistiques scolaires ou les singulières difficultés de mise en oeuvre de l'article 23 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés,” Revue générate de droit 14(1983), 366Google Scholar.

51 Marchand v. Simcoe Board of Education (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 596 (Ont. H.C.J).

52 Ibid., 608.

53 Ibid.,612,618.

54 Ibid., 621.

55 Lavoie v. Nova Scotia (1988), 47 D.L.R. (4th) 586 (N.S.S.C.T.D); and (1989) 58 D.L.R. (4th) 293 (N.S.S.C.A.D).

56 47 D.L.R. (4th) at 588-90.

57 Ibid., 593.

58 Societe des Acadiens v. Association of Parents for Fairness in Education (1986), 27D.L.R. (4th) 406 at 425.

59 58 D.L.R (4th) at 304-05.

60 Make v. Alberta (1990), 68 D.L.R. (4th) 69. This case is not part of the data set because it actually involved judicial nullification. It is discussed here because the Court's interpretation of section 23 is relevant for future remedial decree litigation in the area of minority-language educational rights.

61 Ibid., 82-84.

62 Ibid., 88-90.

63 Ibid., 85.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., 86.

66 68D.L.R. (4th) at 107-08.

67 The Supreme Court has hinted that there are limits to the remedies to which victims of constitutional violations are entitled. For example, the Court has declared that the Charter “does not entitle criminal defendants to the most favourable procedures that could possibly be imagined.” This obviously places a limit on the types of preventive procedural innovations that may be ordered to remedy constitutional deficiencies in the criminal process. See Lyons v. The Queen (1987), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 237. Similarly, in a case involving the political use of compulsory union dues, the trial judge in the remedy phase of proceedings simply attempted to make a limitation on freedom of association more reasonable rather than to eliminate it altogether. See Manfredi,’ ‘Re Lavigne and Ontario Public Service Employees Union,’ 409.

68 In Reference re Public Schools Act (Manitoba), Case No. 21836, March 4, 1993, the Court held that the number of potential French-language students warrants the establishment of an independent French-language school board in Manitoba under the exclusive management and control of the French-language minority. The Court also ordered the province to enact the legislation necessary to implement this decision, which Manitoba has now done.