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Assessing the Utility of, and Measuring Learning from, Canada's IMF Article IV Consultations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 June 2006

Bessma Momani
Bessma Momani*
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo
*
Dr. Bessma Momani, University of Waterloo and Fellow at the Centre for International Governance and Innovation, Department of Political Science and History, 200 University Ave. West, Waterloo, ON. N2L3G1; bmomani@uwaterloo.ca
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Abstract

The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) annual Article IV consultation meetings and ensuing reports are external assessments of member states' economies by highly regarded international economists, designed to ensure that member states conform to IMF-prescribed liberal economic standards. For non-borrowing advanced industrialized countries, like Canada, what is the perceived utility of these annual Article IV consultations? Constructivists suggest that the adept staff of international organizations (IO) teach state civil servants and officials how to better formulate sound policies. However, constructivists need to engage in further empirical study to back up their theoretical assumptions about IO teaching and state learning. Based on personal interviews with Department of Finance staff involved in Article IV consultations and on content analysis of IMF reports on Canada, this paper contributes an empirical study on whether the Fund staff “teaches” and Canada's finance department staff “learns” from the annual surveillance exercises. The findings of this paper suggest that although involved Canadian Finance personnel appreciate meeting with the Fund staff as an academic and intellectual exchange, the policy advice they receive in the Article IV consultations rarely, if ever, changes their economic analyses, because the Fund's advice tends to not be practical. Based on suggestions from Department of Finance staff, as well as IMF evaluations of its bilateral surveillance, this paper concludes with recommendations from the finance staff on how to improve on the utility of Article IV consultations.

Résumé

Résumé

Les réunions annuelles de consultation au titre de l'article IV du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) et les rapports suivant sont des évaluations externes pour les économies des états membre, par des économistes internationaux tres reconnu, conçu pour assurer que ces états membre conforme aux normes économiques libérales prescrit par le FMI. Pour les pays industrialisés avancés non-empruntant, comme le Canada, quel est l'utilité perçue de ces Consultations annuelles au titre de l'article IV? Les constructivists suggère que fonctionnaires habile des organisations internationales (OI) enseigne des fonctionnaires de l'état pour qu'ils puissant mieux forumler leur politique. Cependant, les suppositions théoriques des constructivists a propos de l'enseignement des OI et l'érudition des états ont besoins d'étude empirique plus ample pour expliquer leurs arguments. Basé sur des entretiens personnels avec les personnel du Département de Finance impliqué dans les consultations au titre de l'article IV et sur l'analyse des contenu des rapports de l'FMI sur le Canada, cette article contribue une étude empirique pour determiné si le personnel des Fonds ‘enseigne’ et le personnel du département de finance du Canada ‘apprend’ a travers les exercices de surveillance annuels. Les conclusions de cette article suggèrent que bien que le personnel de Finance Canadien impliqué apprécie la réunion avec les équipe du FMI au tant q'échange intellectuel et dialogue, les conseils de politique dans les consultations au titre de l'article IV donnet rarement, si jamais, un changement dans leur analyse économique parce que les conseils ont tendance à ne pas être pratique. Ce papier conclut, basé sur les suggestions du personnel au Département Canadien de Finance, et par les évaluations du FMI de sa surveillance bilatérale, avec des recommandations au personnel de finance pour améliorer sur l'utilité des consultations au titre de l'article IV.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , June 2006 , pp. 249 - 269
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Cambridge University Press

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