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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
1 James, Patrick, “Energy Politics in Canada, 1980–1981: Threat Power in a Sequential Game,” this Journal 26 (1993), 31–59.Google Scholar
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4 For an extended non-technical discussion, see Dixit, A. and Nalebuff, B., Thinking Strategically (New York: Norton, 1992)Google Scholar, chap. 11, and for a technical discourse, Osborne, and Rubinstein, , Bargaining and MarketsGoogle Scholar, chaps. 3 and 5.
5 James, , “Energy Politics in Canada, 1980–1981,” 35, 43 and 44.Google Scholar
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8 Ibid., 18.
9 Ibid., 22.