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Constitutional Reform of the Judicial Branch: Symbolic vs. Operational Considerations*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Peter H. Russell
Peter H. Russell
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Abstract

If the next stage of constitutional renewal is to be the strengthening of national institutions, consideration should be given to the judicial branch of government as well as to the Senate and House of Commons. In assessing reforms in this area it is important to distinguish the symbolic from operational consequences. First priority should be given to constitutional entrenchment of the Supreme Court. Although the significance of such an amendment is largely symbolic, it is needed to remove uncertainties created by references to the Supreme Court in the Constitution Act, 1982. A general guarantee of judicial independence should be abandoned as a misguided exercise in constitutional symbolism. From both a symbolic and operational perspective, reform of section 96 of the original constitution holds out the most interesting possibility of establishing the constitutional basis for a truly national judiciary.

Résumé

Si nous voulons que la prochaine étape du renouveau constitutionnel soit un renforcement des institutions nationales, nous devons prendre en considération non seulement le Sénat et la Chambre des Communes, mais aussi la branche judiciaire du gouvernement. Lorsqu'on mesure la portée des réformes dans ce domaine, il est important de distinguer conséquence symbolique et conséquence opératoire. De première urgence est une protection constitutionnelle pour la Cour Supreême. Bien qu'un amendement à cet effet ait une portée largement symbolique, il est nécessaire afin de dissiper les incertitudes créées par les références à la Cour Suprême contenues dans la Loi Constitutionnelle de 1982. Une garantie générate de I'indépendance du judiciaire doit être abandonnée, comme étant un exercice aberrant en symbolisme constitutionnel. D'un point de vue à la fois symbolique et opératoire, une réforme de l'article 96 de la constitution originelle est ce qui offre le plus de promesses pour la création, sur une assise constitutionnelle, d'un judiciaire vraiment national.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , June 1984 , pp. 227 - 252
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1984

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References

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